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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING CORP., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : Appellate No. 98-0062 CA 
vs. : Priority No. 15 
J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION, dba JACK'S : 
SOUTHWEST COLLISION REPAIR and 
JOHN W. CUMBERLEDGE, JR., : 
Defendants and Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellants appeal from a final order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, the Honorable William W. Barrett presiding, granting judgment in 
favor of appellee Colonial Pacific Leasing Corporation. The instant appeal was 
commenced in the Utah Supreme Court, with jurisdiction conferred upon that court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1997). The Utah Supreme Court 
subsequently poured over this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was there sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Appellants 
accepted the leased equipment, and therefore were obligated to comply with the 
lease agreement? STANDARD OF REVIEW: Contrary to the standards of review 
erroneously cited in Appellants' Brief, whether or not Appellants accepted the 
leased equipment is a question of fact, which is reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Abdnor. 918 F.2d 128, 130 (10th 
Cir. 1990).l 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The following statutory authorities are either determinative in this appeal or 
are of such central importance as to merit their inclusion herein, and are therefore 
copied and attached hereto as Addendum "A": 
(1) Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-103(l)(g) (1997)(definition of finance 
lease); 
(2) Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-407 (1997)(irrevocable promises - finance 
leases); 
(3) Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515 (1997)(acceptance of goods); 
(4) Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-516 (1997)(effect of acceptance of goods); 
^he appropriate standard of review is discussed infra in the "Argument" section. 
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and 
(5) Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-517 (1997)(revocation of acceptance of 
goods).2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellee has no objection to the "Nature of the Case" statement contained in 
Appellants' Brief. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below 
In addition to the information contained in this section of Appellants' Brief, 
Appellee would add that prior to the entry of the trial court's final order on 
December 30, 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing on November 24, 1997, at 
which time the trial court's ruling, and the basis therefore, was verbally 
communicated to counsel for all parties. A copy of the transcript of this hearing is 
attached hereto as Addendum "B", and is the subject of the parties' Stipulation to 
Modify the Record, on file herein. 
C. Statement of Facts 
In addition to the facts set forth in Appellants' Brief, Colonial provides the 
2Appellants include Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-509 (1997) among their recitation 
of the "Determinative Authorities." Appellants have failed to acknowledge, however, 
that this provision expressly applies exclusively to "installment lease contracts," which 
the contract at issue in this case was not. This issue is also discussed more fully infra 
in the "Argument" section. 
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following for the Court's consideration: 
1. Appellants/Defendants J.W.CJ.R. Corporation, dba Jack's Southwest 
Collision Repair and John W. Cumberledge, Jr. (collectively "Cumberledge"), 
entered into a valid and binding lease agreement (the "lease") with Colonial Pacific 
Leasing Corporation ("Colonial") involving the lease of certain computer equipment 
("equipment") for use in his automobile repair shop. (R. at 61-62). 
2. The lease was a statutory finance lease3 governed by Article 2A of 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-101, et seq. 
(1997). 
3. With leases of the kind at issue in this case, the lessee goes to a 
vendor, selects a piece of equipment and then the vendor goes to a lease broker, 
and the broker then finds a funding source, which in this case was Colonial. 
Colonial did not manufacture the equipment. (Trial Transcript ("T.T.") at 11). 
4. Prior to signing the lease, the vendor, Bottomline Systems, Inc. 
("Bottomline" or the "vendor"), came out to Cumberledge's repair shop, and 
performed a demonstration for him. Cumberledge looked at the demonstration 
materials, and picked out the equipment according to Bottomline's advice. (T.T. at 
3A "finance lease" is a defined term under the U.C.C. that means, inter alia, the 
lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply the goods, and the lessor acquires the 
goods or the right to possession and use of the goods in connection with the lease. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-103(l)(g) (1997). 
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68). 
5. Cumberledge signed a 36-month lease contract with Colonial on June 
9, 1993. (T.T. at 7; Exhibit 1 received, T.T. at 7; R. at 51). (A copy of the 
pertinent lease documents referred to herein and trial exhibits are attached hereto as 
Addendum "C"). Cumberledge testified at trial that he had a chance to read the 
lease documents before he signed them, and "nobody twisted [his] arm." (T.T. at 
6. The lease contract contains the following provisions: 
3. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND CLAIMS; 
LIMITATION OF REMEDIES. THERE ARE NO 
WARRANTIES BY OR ON BEHALF OF LESSOR. 
LESSEE ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES BY HIS 
SIGNATURE BELOW AS FOLLOWS: (A) LESSOR 
MAKES NO WARRANTIES EITHER EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED AS TO THE CONDITION OF THE 
EQUIPMENT, ITS MERCHANTABILITY, ITS FITNESS 
OR SUITABILITY FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE, 
ITS DESIGN, ITS CONDITION, ITS CAPACITY, ITS 
QUALITY, OR WITH RESPECT TO ANY 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EQUIPMENT; (B) LESSEE 
HAS FULLY INSPECTED THE EQUIPMENT WHICH IT 
HAS REQUESTED LESSOR TO ACQUIRE AND LEASE 
TO LESSEE, AND THE EQUIPMENT IS IN GOOD 
CONDITION AND TO LESSEE'S COMPLETE 
SATISFACTION; (C) LESSEE LEASES THE 
EQUIPMENT "AS IS" AND WITH ALL FAULTS; (D) 
LESSEE SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE 
EQUIPMENT IS LEASED TO LESSEE SOLELY FOR 
COMMERCIAL OR BUSINESS PURPOSES AND NOT 
FOR PERSONAL, FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD, OR 
AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES; (E) IF THE EQUIPMENT 
IS NOT PROPERLY INSTALLED, DOES NOT OPERATE 
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AS REPRESENTED OR WARRANTED BY THE 
SUPPLIER OR MANUFACTURER, OR IS 
UNSATISFACTORY FOR ANY REASON, REGARDLESS 
OF CAUSE OR CONSEQUENCE, LESSEE'S ONLY 
REMEDY, IF ANY, SHALL BE AGAINST THE 
SUPPLIER OR MANUFACTURER OF THE EQUIPMENT 
AND NOT AGAINST LESSOR; (F) PROVD3ED LESSEE 
IS NOT IN DEFAULT UNDER THIS LEASE, LESSOR 
ASSIGNS TO LESSEE ANY WARRANTEES MADE BY 
THE SUPPLIER OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE 
EQUIPMENT; (G) LESSEE SHALL HAVE NO REMEDY 
FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES 
AGAINST LESSOR; AND (H) NO DEFECT, DAMAGE, 
OR UNFITNESS OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR ANY 
PURPOSE SHALL RELIEVE LESSEE OF THE 
OBLIGATION TO PAY RENT OR RELIEVE LESSEE OF 
ANY OTHER OBLIGATION UNDER THIS LEASE. 
[Note: Paragraph 3 is printed in all caps, red ink, set-off by a 
red border that boxes it in, and initialed by Cumberledge as a 
"specifically negotiated and agreed to paragraph."] 
4. STATUTORY FINANCE LEASE. Lessee agrees and 
acknowledges that it is the intent of both, parties to this Lease 
that it qualify as a statutory finance lease under Article 2A of 
the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Oregon. 
THIS LEASE IS NOT CANCELABLE OR TERMINABLE BY 
LESSEE. 
11. LESSEE'S REPRESENTATIONS AND WAIVERS. To 
the extent permitted by applicable law, Lessee hereby waives 
any and all rights and remedies conferred upon a Lessee by 
sections 2A-508 through 2A-522 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, including but not limited to Lessee's right to: (i) cancel 
this Lease; (ii) repudiate this Lease; (iii) reject the Equipment; 
(iv) revoke acceptance of the Equipment; . . . . 
19. INDEMNITY. Lessee shall hold Lessor harmless and 
indemnify and defend Lessor against any claims, actions, 
damages, or liabilities including, without limitation, all 
attorney's fees, arising out of or connected with the Equipment 
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or this Lease. Such indemnification shall survive the 
expiration, cancellation, or termination of this Lease. Lessee 
waives any immunity Lessee may have under any industrial 
insurance act, with regard to indemnification of Lessor. 
26. ENTIRE AGREEMENT; NO ORAL MODIFICATION; 
NO WAIVER. This instrument constitutes the entire 
agreement between Lessor and Lessee. No provision of this 
Lease shall be modified or rescinded unless in writing signed 
by a representative of Lessor. Waiver by Lessor of any 
provision hereof in one instance shall not constitute a waiver as 
to any other instance. 
(Addendum "C")(emphasis in original). 
7. Cumberledge signed an "Acknowledgement and Acceptance of 
Equipment by Lessee" ("Acceptance") prior to actual delivery of the equipment. 
(T.T. at 8; Exhibit 2 received, T.T. at 15; R. at 51; Addendum "C"). 
8. The Acceptance states in relevant part: 
Lessee hereby acknowledges that the Equipment described above has 
been received in good condition and repair, has been properly 
installed, tested, and inspected, and is operating satisfactorily in all 
respects for all of Lessee's intended uses and purposes. Lessee 
hereby accepts unconditionally and irrevocably the Equipment. 
By signature below, Lessee specifically authorizes and request [sic] 
Colonial Pacific Leasing Corporation to make payment to the supplier 
of the Equipment. Lessee agrees that said Equipment has been 
delivered, installed, or accepted on a trial basis. 
WITH THE DELIVERY OF THIS DOCUMENT TO LESSOR, 
LESSEE ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES THAT LESSEE'S 
OBLIGATIONS TO LESSOR BECOME ABSOLUTE AND 
IRREVOCABLE AND LESSEE SHALL BE FOREVER ESTOPPED 
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FROM DENYING THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE 
REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN THIS DOCUMENT. 
[UNDATED] [SIGNATURE - JOHN W. CUMBERLEDGE] 
9. The equipment was delivered on June 10, 1993, the day after the lease 
agreement was signed. (T.T. at 12, 58). 
10. In the usual course of business, Colonial completes a verbal and 
written verification that the lessee has received the equipment and is satisfied with 
it. (T.T. at 12). 
11. The lease is then funded by Colonial based on the personal and 
business credit of the lessee and guarantor, as well as the acceptance of the 
equipment. (T.T. at 12). The vendor, in this case Bottomline, is not paid until the 
lessee has received the equipment, and the verbal verification of acceptance is 
completed. (T.T. at 14). 
12. The "Lease Processing Sheet," admitted into evidence as Exhibit 3 
(T.T. at 20; R. at 51), verifies the following personal conversations with 
Cumberledge: 
a. On June 10, 1993, Cumberledge told a Colonial representative 
that the equipment was delivered, but it was not all working yet; the vendor 
was coming the next day to work on it; the Colonial representative indicated 
they would call him back the next morning; 
b. On June 11, 1993, Cumberledge told Colonial the equipment 
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was installed, was in operation, and he understood the terms and conditions 
of the lease, and it was okay to start the lease. 
(T.T. at 12-13). 
13. In short, Colonial personally spoke to Cumberledge. He said the 
equipment was operating, and based upon his statements, Colonial funded the lease. 
(T.T. at 52). 
14. Cumberledge admitted at trial the foregoing conversations with 
Colonial, and that Bottomline came out and installed "everything" and trained him 
for a couple of hours on how to run the equipment. Furthermore, Cumberledge 
admitted that two to three days after he received the equipment, he told Colonial it 
was operational. (T.T. at 59). 
15. Lease brokers often have lessees sign a written acknowledgment at the 
same time the lease contract is signed, in advance of the equipment actually being 
delivered, which is why a telephone verification of acceptance is completed. (T.T. 
at 14-15). 
16. Consistent with his acceptance of the equipment and the terms and 
conditions of the lease agreement, Cumberledge made his initial payment of 
$551.76 to Colonial. (T.T. at 8; Exhibit 2). This was the only payment made to 
Colonial. (T.T. at 9, 48). 
17. Colonial records indicate that the first time Colonial spoke with 
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Cumberledge after his acceptance of the equipment on June 11, 1993, was on 
October 30, 1995, two years after the lease was initiated, because the account was 
delinquent. (T.T. at 16). 
18. The delay in contact was the result of Colonial upgrading to a new 
computer system, which resulted in 125-150 accounts "that kind of fell through the 
crevice and disappeared off the computer system." These accounts reemerged in 
approximately October of 1995. (T.T. at 17). 
19. Colonial learned for the first time on October 30, 1995, that 
Cumberledge believed the equipment was junk, and that he claimed to have 
returned it to the vendor in June of 1993. (T.T. at 17). 
20. Colonial contacted Bottomline on November 6, 1995, and they said 
they had no record of receiving the equipment. They subsequently went by 
Cumberledge's place of business on November 15, 1995, and the equipment 
appeared to still be in Cumberledge's back room, and Cumberledge admitted he 
still had the equipment in boxes. (T.T. at 18). 
2L Consistent with normal business practice, if a lessee communicated to 
the lessor that the equipment was not functioning, that would be reflected in the 
computer records. If Cumberledge had called Colonial, it would have been 
recorded. (T.T. at 18-19). 
22. Even if Cumberledge notified Colonial the equipment was not 
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functioning, but did so after accepting the equipment, Colonial would not in the 
usual course of business forgive the lease because it is noncancelable. (T.T. at 19). 
23. As Colonial's representative testified at trial, the disclaimer in the 
lease contract means that if the lessee has any problems with the equipment or the 
vendor, the vendor is responsible for it. (T.T. at 36). 
24. Colonial does not have, nor has it ever had payment books. (T.T. at 
50). Colonial is not required to send bills, nor does it say anywhere in the lease 
that Colonial would send bills. (T.T. at 52). 
25. Cumberledge testified that after he communicated to Colonial that the 
equipment was operational, it did not continue to function. (T.T. at 59-60). 
26. The representation that Cumberledge had 30 days to evaluate the 
equipment, was made by the vendor, Bottomline, not Colonial. (T.T. at 61-62). 
27. Cumberledge knew it was Bottomline supplying the equipment, and 
that they were a local company. (T.T. at 69). 
28. When he had problems with the equipment, Cumberledge 
immediately went to Bottomline. He did not expect someone from Colonial to 
come down from Oregon and fix the equipment. Cumberledge knew Bottomline 
was supposed to fix it. (T.T. at 70). 
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29. Cumberledge's computer expert admitted that he never called anyone 
at Colonial because they were the leasing company, not a computer company. 
(T.T. at 78). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Article 2A of the U.C.C. which governs leases is controlling in this case. A 
lessee's acceptance of leased goods carries with it serious legal consequences, 
including but not limited to the irrevocability of lessee's promises embodied in the 
"hell or high water" provision of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-407. Acceptance 
occurs after the lessee has a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods, and 
signifies that the goods are conforming. Acceptance is a question of fact that is 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. There is an abundance of record 
evidence in this case that Judge Barrett properly relied on to conclude Cumberledge 
accepted the equipment. Cumberledge acknowledges that two or three days after 
delivery and installation of the equipment, and after training by the vendor on the 
equipment, he spoke with Colonial and indicated it was operational. Furthermore, 
Colonial confirmed at that time that Cumberledge understood the terms and 
conditions of the lease, and it was okay to start the lease. In addition, 
Cumberledge signed a written acceptance of the equipment. Even though it was 
signed before actual delivery of the equipment, it demonstrates Cumberledge 
understood the significance of acceptance. The written acceptance was also later 
12 
ratified by Cumberledge's verbal verification of acceptance. Relying on 
Cumberledge's acceptance, Colonial funded the lease. Acceptance of the equipment 
rendered Cumberledge's duties and obligations, including the payment of rent, 
noncancelable and irrevocable. 
Cumberledge cannot reject equipment he has already accepted. The U.C.C. 
specifically prohibits rejection of equipment after acceptance has taken place. 
Furthermore, Cumberledge expressly waived in the lease contract any right he had 
to reject or revoke acceptance of the equipment. Finally, Cumberledge erroneously 
relies on Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-509 to support his rejection argument. This 
Code provision applies exclusively to installment lease contracts, which this lease 
was not. 
Colonial did not consent to the cancellation of the lease. Cumberledge could 
not reasonably rely on a representation by Colonial, ostensibly forgiving his 
obligation to make payments for three years, particularly when the contract said 
that all the duties and obligations of the parties are contained within the document. 
Finally, there was no consideration given for such representation, therefore it is not 
binding upon Colonial. 
Cumberledge cannot hold Colonial responsible for a supposed thirty-day trial 
period to test the equipment - a promise allegedly made by the vendor, Bottomline. 
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The lease contract between Colonial and Cumberledge is immediately effective 
upon acceptance. There is no provision for a thirty-day trial period. The lease 
contract contains the entire agreement between the parties, and specifically 
disclaims all warranties. 
ARGUMENT 
CUMBERLEDGE ACCEPTED THE EQUIPMENT, AND WAS 
THEREFORE OBLIGATED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT. 
Acceptance of leased equipment is a pivotal event under Article 2A of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. The finance leasing industry relies upon acceptance of 
the leased goods to disburse funds. Once acceptance occurs, the lessee's promises are 
therefore deemed legally irrevocable. Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-2a-407 
(1997), popularly referred to as the "hell or high water" provision, states in relevant 
part: 
(1) In the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease,4 
4
"Consumer lease" is defined in Article 2a as "a lease that a lessor, regularly 
engaged in the business of leasing or selling, makes to a lessee, who is an individual 
and who takes under the lease primarily for a personal, family, or household 
purpose." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-103(l)(e) (1997). It is undisputed in this case 
that Cumberledge leased the equipment for use in his automobile collision repair shop 
in order to generate computer estimates and assist with shop management. (T.T. at 
55, 58). As such, the equipment was not primarily for personal, family, or household 
purpose, and therefore was not taken under a consumer lease. Furthermore, 
Cumberledge specifically acknowledged in the lease contract that the equipment was 
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the lessee's promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and 
independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods. 
(2) A promise that has become irrevocable and independent 
under Subsection (1): 
(a) is effective and enforceable between the parties, and 
by or against third parties including assignees of the parties; and 
(b) is not subject to cancellation, termination, 
modification, repudiation, excuse, or substitution without the 
consent of the party to whom the promise runs. 
In addition, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-2a-516(2) (1997), "[a] 
lessee's acceptance of goods precludes rejection of the goods accepted."5 
Article 2A further states that acceptance of goods occurs when: 
(a) the lessee has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the 
goods and the lessee signifies or acts with respect to the goods in a 
manner that signifies to the lessor or the supplier that the goods are 
conforming or that the lessee will take or retain them in spite of their 
nonconformity; or 
(b) the lessee fails to make an effective rejection of the goods 
as provided in Subsection 70A-2a-509(2). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515 (1997). As discussed below, Cumberledge had a 
reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods, and it is undisputed that he signified to 
Colonial that the goods were conforming. In short, Cumberledge accepted the leased 
equipment. Based on that acceptance, Colonial funded the lease, and Cumberledge's 
promises set forth in the lease agreement became irrevocable. 
leased for commercial, not personal use. (Addendum "C"; Lease 1 3(D)). 
5Curiously, Appellants have failed to cite or discuss this U.C.C. provision 
anywhere in their brief. 
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A. Whether or Not Cumberledge Accepted the Leased Equipment 
is a Question of Fact Reviewed Under the Clearly Erroneous 
Standard, 
Extensive research of standards of review applicable to Article 2A 
interpretation, as well as general contract law, has failed to reveal any case law 
directly on point. Cases that have adopted standards of review when considering 
similar principles, however, support the application of the "clearly erroneous" standard 
in this case. 
Appellants erroneously rely on two cases to support their contention that the "no 
deference" or "de novo" standard applies to the issue of acceptance: (1) United Park 
v. Greater Park. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); (2) State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994). See Appellants' Brief at 2. Neither of these cases deals with a lease 
agreement, or even a general contract dispute. United Park focused on the proper 
standard of review to be applied to the trial court's conclusion that a relevant statute 
of limitations had expired. United Park, 870 P.2d at 885. Pena dealt with the issue 
of the appropriate standard of care to be applied to reasonable suspicion determinations 
in criminal cases. Pena. 896 P.2d at 934. Like ships passing in the night, these cases 
don't come close to supporting application of the de novo standard in this case. 
The Pena decision does, however, provide some guidance on determining the 
proper standard of review in a given case: 
At the most basic level, two different types of questions are presented to 
a trial court: questions of law and questions of fact. Factual questions 
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are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, 
actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the 
subjective, such as state of mind. Legal determinations, on the other 
hand, are defined as those which are not of fact but are essentially of 
rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and 
status in similar circumstances. 
Id. at 935 (citations omitted). Acceptance is more appropriately characterized as an 
event, an action, a condition happening, existing, or taking place. It is an occurrence 
that can be specifically pinpointed in time. In addition, it also involves the subjective, 
i.e. did the person, in their mind, intend to accept the goods? The issue of 
reasonableness, in this case whether there was reasonable opportunity to inspect the 
goods, is without a doubt a factual issue reserved for the trier of fact. See Onyeabor 
v. Pro Roofing. Inc., 787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah 1990)(whether plaintiff was driving 
faster than was reasonable and prudent); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 148-49 
(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)(whether plaintiff reasonably 
relied on misrepresentations). Cumberledge admits that what constitutes a "reasonable 
opportunity to inspect" is a question of fact. Appellants' Brief at 11. 
The Pena court went on to state as follows: 
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making 
determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate 
court under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to find 
clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial 
court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes 
in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination. This standard is highly deferential to the trial court 
because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and 
the evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered 
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to be in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to 
derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court 
cannot hope to garner from a cold record. 
Id. at 935-36. In this case, Judge Barrett was in the best position to determine the 
issue of acceptance. As discussed below, Judge Barrett had substantial record evidence 
demonstrating Cumberledge's acceptance of the equipment. To the extent there was 
any evidence to the contrary, Judge Barrett's decision nonetheless must stand. 
Several cases provide some persuasive authority for the application of the 
clearly erroneous standard in this case. In Valley Nat'l Bank v. Abdnor. 918 F.2d 
128, 130 (10th Cir. 1990), the court held that the trial court's finding of a material 
breach of contract is a question of fact that is controlled by the clearly erroneous 
standard. Furthermore, it is well-settled in Utah, that if a contract is found to be 
ambiguous, the intent of the parties to the contract becomes an issue, and the issue of 
intent is a question of fact, which is sustained on appeal unless it is found to be clearly 
erroneous. Fitzgerald v. Corbett. 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990); Anesthesiologists 
Assoc, v. St. Benedict's. 852 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah App. 1993). See also Sorenson 
v.Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah App. 1994)(existence of 
implied-in-fact employment contract is a question of fact); Steven Alan Childress and 
Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review 2-176 (2d ed., 1992)(other question of 
fact matters relating to contracts include: mutual mistake, whether obligations fulfilled 
or performable within a year or at all, whether damages established and how much, 
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whether agreements integrated into contract, whether consent vitiated, whether 
bailment relationship formed, whether an event was accidental, and what a party said). 
B. There is Abundant Undisputed Evidence in the Record 
Supporting a Finding of Acceptance. 
Bottomline performed a demonstration for Cumberledge. He was familiar with 
the type of equipment he was getting before he ever signed a lease agreement. The 
equipment was delivered the day after signing the contract. Based on Cumberledge's 
own testimony, after having possession and the opportunity to inspect the equipment 
for two to three days, and after all the equipment was installed and Bottomline trained 
him on it, he told Colonial it was operational. (T.T. at 12-13, 52, 59). The record 
evidence demonstrates that on June 11, 1993, Cumberledge told Colonial the 
equipment had been installed, was in operation, and he understood the terms and 
conditions of the lease, and it was okay to start the lease. (T.T. at 12-13). In 
addition, Cumberledge had also made his first payment, which is also consistent with 
acceptance. (T.T. at 8; Exhibit 2). It is recognized that a lessee will often signify 
acceptance through conduct, including paying for the leased goods. See William D. 
Hawkland and Frederick H. Miller, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2A-515:03 
at 840 (1993). 
Cumberledge also signed a written "Acknowledgement and Acceptance of 
Equipment by Lessee" ("Acceptance"), although this was admittedly prior to actual 
delivery of the equipment. (T.T. at 8; Exhibit 2 received, T.T. at 15; R. at 51; 
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Addendum "C").6 Even though delivery of Cumberledge's equipment had not 
occurred, he had already observed the demonstration of the vendor, and knew the type 
of equipment he was getting. Furthermore, by signing the Acceptance, Cumberledge 
knew, or should have known, the significance of the act of acceptance, and that once 
it occurred, his obligation to comply with the lease contract became "ABSOLUTE 
AND IRREVOCABLE," and that by accepting the equipment, he was authorizing 
Colonial to pay the vendor for the equipment. (Addendum "C"; Exhibit 2). 
Cumberledge's subsequent verbal verification of acceptance effectively ratified 
his prior written Acceptance of the equipment. The concept of ratification is not new. 
For example, in agency law, a principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an 
agreement made by an unauthorized agent. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 
(Utah 1982). The ratification also relates back to the time the act in question occurred, 
and is binding and cannot afterward be revoked or recalled. IcL This Court 
6Appellants state in their brief that "it appears to be a standard business practice of 
Colonial to encourage their customers to lie by signing the Acceptance before ever 
receiving delivery of the leased goods." Appellants' Brief at 12 (citing McNatt v. 
Colonial Pacific Leasing. 472 S.E.2d 435 (1996)). Colonial is offended by the 
suggestion that they "encourage customers to lie." As a practical matter, lease 
documents are prepared by and submitted for signature by lease brokers (such as the 
"leasing agents" in McNatt). who are independent of Colonial. (T.T. at 11-12, 48). 
Often, as a matter of convenience, these brokers have lessees sign all pertinent lease 
documents simultaneously in order to expedite the lease transaction and delivery of the 
leased goods. Colonial is aware that this can happen, which is why there is a 
subsequent telephone verification of acceptance, prior to funding the lease. (T.T. at 
11-12, 48). The notion that Colonial encourages the practice of premature signing is 
utterly false and wholly unsupported in the record. 
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acknowledged the principal of ratification in Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 
14, 16 (Utah App. 1995). In Horrocks, a milking equipment manufacturer was held 
to have ratified the equipment dealer's act of having a dairy farmer sign a "Purchaser's 
Acknowledgment & Delivery Acceptance Receipt" prior to actual delivery of all the 
relevant equipment. IcL 
Appellants imply that the trial court should be reversed due to some technical 
flaw in its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," namely that there was no 
express finding of acceptance. Appellants' Brief at 9-10. Appellants go on to 
acknowledge, however, that the conclusions of law of the trial court "assume, without 
explicitly stating, that lessees accepted the leased goods, and thus became irrevocably 
committed to making payments under the lease." Appellants' Brief at 9. Judge 
Barrett, ruling from the bench nearly two months following the trial, communicated 
to counsel six findings of fact, and then before expressing his conclusions of law, 
stated: "I'm sure there are other facts that support this finding and the following -
these findings and the following conclusions of law. . . . " (Judge's Ruling at 3, 
attached hereto as Addendum "B"). Judge Barrett thus expressly acknowledged that 
there were additional facts supporting his "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
Given the abundant record evidence of acceptance, it is clear that Judge Barrett at least 
impliedly found acceptance took place. Moreover, any technical deficiency in Judge 
Barrett's "Findings" was harmless error, in light of all the record evidence. See 
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Kinkellav. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)(trial court's failure to enter specific 
finding of contractor's licensure was harmless error). 
C. Case Law Supports the Irrevocability of Cumberledge's 
Promises, 
Case law interpreting Article 2A of the U.C.C. is scant, and Appellee's 
research of case law applying the acceptance portion of Article 2A, codified at Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515, failed to identify any such cases. It is clear, however, from 
the U.C.C. provisions themselves, and case law applying Section 407 (the "hell or 
high water" provision), that Cumberledge accepted the equipment, resulting in 
Cumberledge's duties and obligations under the lease agreement becoming immediately 
irrevocable. In Emlee Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Waterburv Transmission, Inc., 23 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 389, 401 (Conn. Ct. App. 1993), the court, applying Section 
407, upheld a provision in a finance lease of a pipe bending machine that stated the 
lease could not be canceled or terminated by the lessee, and that the lessee's payment 
obligation was absolute and unconditional. See also AT&T Credit Corp. v. 
Transelobal Telecom Alliance, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 299, 302 (D.N.J. 1997)(applying 
New Jersey's U.C.C. provision governing the irrevocability of lessee's promises, 
N.J.S.A. 12A:2A-407, held a lessee's promise to make all requisite payments and not 
assert any defenses to payment are valid and enforceable). 
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D. The Concept of Rejection Provides no Refuge for 
Cumberledge's Ailing Position, 
Cumber ledge cannot reject equipment he has already accepted. This concept 
is the crux of the "hell or high water" provision of the U.C.C. As one noted scholar 
has stated: 
'Acceptance' is a key event under Article 2A. When it occurs, 
the lessee loses his power to reject the leased goods, is bound to pay the 
rent, and must carry the burden of proof regarding breach. 
Thomas M. Quinn, Quinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 
1 2A-515[A][1] at 2A-185 (2d ed., vol. 1, 1991). Furthermore, Article 2A expressly 
forbids rejection: "A lessee's acceptance of goods precludes rejection of the goods 
accepted." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-516(2) (1997). Consistent with this provision, 
the lease contract specifically states that Cumberledge waives his right to reject the 
equipment, or revoke his acceptance. (Addendum "C"; Lease 111). 
Cumberledge's reliance on the doctrine of rejection as embodied in Utah Code 
Annotated Section 70A-2a-509 (1997) is grossly misplaced. That portion of the code 
expressly involves installment lease contracts, which are defined as "a lease contract 
that authorizes or requires the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately 
accepted, even though the lease contract contains a clause stating 'each delivery is a 
separate lease' or its equivalent." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-103(l)(i) (1997). There 
can be no legitimate dispute that the computer equipment at issue in this case, was not 
subject to delivery in separate lots. Obviously this was not an installment lease 
23 
contract. Rejection therefore fails to provide Cumberledge any relief.7 
In short, to allow Cumberledge to reject goods after he has already expressly 
accepted them, would profoundly erode a lessor's ability to rely on the validity of 
written lease agreements. Invariably, finance companies would be reluctant to release 
any funds. 
E. Sound Public Policy Favors Strict Observance of the Rule of 
Acceptance, 
It is important to understand the context in which a finance lease arises. The 
finance lease involves three parties: the supplier (or vendor), the lessor, and the lessee. 
Normally, as in this case, the lessee selects the equipment that he needs from the 
supplier, and the lessor purchases the equipment at the direction of the lessee, and then 
leases the equipment to the lessee.8 "The lessee relies on the supplier for all 
7In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-509(l) (1997) makes it clear that rejection 
applies "if the goods or the tender or delivery fail in any respect to conform to the 
lease contract...." The lease contract required the delivery of a "Bottomline Shop 
Management System: 386DX/40Mhz CPU, etc." (Addendum "C"; Exhibit 1; R. at 
51). Appellants have never alleged that the equipment was anything but the equipment 
described in Exhibit "A" to the lease contract. For example, if Bottomline had 
delivered a "286" computer or something other than what was supposed to be 
delivered, rejection would have been an option available to Appellants. Appellants 
may not allege rejection because they received exactly what they were supposed to 
receive pursuant to the lease agreement. 
8The "lease contract" describes the duties and obligations between lessor and 
lessee, whereas the "supply contract" describes the contract under which the lessor 
buys the leased goods from a third-party supplier or vendor. Thomas M. Quinn, 
Ouinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest f 2A-103[A][11] at 
2A-32 to 2A-33 (2d ed., vol. 1, 1991). 
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warranties and representations with respect to the goods. The lessor serves only to 
finance the transaction." Ethan A. Gross, The Finance Lease Under Article 2A. 1993 
Det. C.L. Rev. 127, 128 (1993)(citing U.C.C. § 2A-103 cmt.(1990)). 
Finance leases have become increasingly popular over the years, due to the 
advantages to both the lessor and the lessee. Benefits to the lessor include "one makes 
no warranties and the rental payments must be made whether or not the leased 
equipment works." Id. at 129 n.10.9 Benefits to the lessee include a positive tax 
result by leasing as opposed to purchasing equipment. IdL As a matter of policy, 
legislators have decided to turn on the money faucet by making leasing available as an 
alternative form of financing. To allow this tripartite relationship among lessor, 
lessee, and vendor, to work, it was recognized that in order for financing companies 
to release funds, they must receive some assurance they are going to be repaid. 
Hence, the passage of the "hell or high water" provision in Section 2a-407. "This 
clause creates an irrevocable lease which requires the lessee to continue paying rentals 
regardless of the condition of the equipment." IdL at 146; see also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2a-407 (Utah's codification of the "hell or high water" provision). 
Interestingly, the assurances contained in the "hell or high water" provision are 
9Various code provisions specifically exclude the finance lessor from warranties, 
including the implied warranty of merchantability (Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-212 
(1997)), and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2a-213 (1997)). 
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deemed of such importance, they are self-executing — they don't even have to be 
contained within the written lease contract. William D. Hawkland and Frederick H. 
Miller, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2A-407 at 629 (1993)(quoting "Official 
Comment" to Section 2A-407). The Emlee court, cited above, discussed the 
importance and function of the "hell or high water" provision: 
This provision is frequently part of a finance lease because upon delivery 
and acceptance of the subject equipment, the lessor's promised 
obligation, which is to purchase the equipment, has been fulfilled. The 
lessor's money has been spent and it is required to do nothing further. 
In that respect, the lessor's position is similar to that of a bank holding 
a note for the price of the equipment. The lessee, however, will not 
have fulfilled its promised obligations until all rental payments have been 
made. The purpose of the clause, therefore, is to ensure completion of 
the lessee's performance. 
Emlee. 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 401-02 (citations omitted); see also William D. 
Hawkland and Frederick H. Miller, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2A-516:02 
at 855 (1993)("Once the lessee accepts the goods the rent is due according to the lease 
contract."). 
Once Cumberledge accepted the equipment, his duties and obligations under the 
lease became absolute. Why? Because Colonial has already funded the lease. The 
money has already gone out the door to pay for the equipment. Unfortunately 
Cumberledge cannot jump into a time machine and undo what has already been done. 
If there are problems with the equipment, Cumberledge must look to the vendor, not 
Colonial. 
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F. Whether Cumberledge Revoked Acceptance of the Equipment 
is Not an Issue on Appeal, 
Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-2a-517 allows for a lessee to revoke 
acceptance of goods, but only in very limited circumstances. However, Appellants 
never raised the issue of revocation before the trial court, and therefore may not have 
it considered for the first time on appeal. This Court has consistently declined to 
address for the first time on appeal, an issue that a party failed to raise before the trial 
court. West One Bank v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.. 887 P.2d 880, 882 n. 1 (Utah App. 
1994); see also State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987)(ordinarily 
appellate court will not entertain an issue first raised on appeal in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances or plain error). 
Even assuming revocation were considered on appeal, there was no revocation 
of acceptance in this case. Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-2a-517 (1997), states 
in relevant part: 
(1) A lessee may revoke acceptance of a lot or commercial unit 
whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to the lessee if the 
lessee has accepted it: 
(a) except in the case of a finance lease, on the reasonable 
assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not 
been seasonably cured; or 
(b) without discovery of the nonconformity if the lessee's 
acceptance was reasonably induced either by the lessor's 
assurances or, except in the case of a finance lease, by the 
difficulty of discovery before acceptance. 
Section 517 severely curtails the finance lessee's ability to revoke acceptance of 
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equipment. Revocation is limited to where assurances by the lessor induce the lessee 
to accept the goods. There is no evidence in the record that Cumberledge's acceptance 
of the equipment on June 11, 1993, was in any way induced by any assurances by 
Colonial. 
As one legal scholar has noted, "[t]he right to revoke acceptance in the case of 
a finance lease is very limited. The lessee may revoke his acceptance only if the 
goods fail to conform to the lease contract." Steven R. Schoenfeld, The Finance 
Lease, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 565, 579 (1989)(emphasis added)(citing various 
U.C.C. provisions, stating the lessee cannot revoke acceptance for nonconformity with 
respect to the supply contract; as third-party beneficiary to supply contract, lessee 
would have a cause of action against supplier); see also William D. Hawkland and 
Frederick H. Miller, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2A-515:02 at 839 (1993) 
(revocation of acceptance possible only where nonconformity substantially impairs the 
value to the lessee and "often, in a finance lease, not at all"); § 2A-517:04 at 914 
("Revocation of acceptance is severely limited in the finance lease context."). 
G. Colonial Did Not Consent to Cancellation of the Lease, 
Cumberledge's attempt to manufacture consent by acquiescence is ill-fated. A 
Colonial representative testified at trial that there was no documentary evidence that 
Cumberledge was told if no payment booklet was sent, he did not have to worry about 
the lease. (T.T. at 18-19). In fact, the testimony was that Colonial would never say 
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that to a lessee, because: (1) Colonial has never sent payment booklets to lessees (T.T. 
at 50);10 and (2) the lease, upon acceptance of the equipment, was irrevocable. (T.T. 
at 19). Whether such a representation was made, was in the first place a question of 
fact, reserved for the trial court. There was sufficient evidence for the trial court to 
conclude that it never happened. 
In addition, even assuming such representation was made by Colonial, it would 
not be reasonable, as was argued to the trial court, for Cumberledge to rely on that 
representation, and not worry about paying anything more on a three-year obligation, 
particularly when there is a contract that says all the terms and conditions are 
contained within the document. (T.T. at 93). The lease contract states that "[n]o 
provision of this Lease shall be modified or rescinded unless in writing signed by a 
representative of Lessor." (Addendum "C"; Lease 1 26). As discussed above, 
whether reliance was reasonable is a question of fact reserved for the trial court. 
Finally, there was no consideration given for the supposed forgiveness of the 
lease, therefore it cannot be binding upon Colonial. Simply put, the law does not 
enforce all promises. "For a promise to be legally enforceable, it must be supported 
10Appellants rely on a statement in a "Lease Processing Sheet" that contains the 
statement that "[y]ou will be invoiced monthly for $275.88." (Addendum "C"; 
Exhibit 3; R. at 51). This was an unsigned in-house lease processing document that 
came into existence after the lease contract was signed by the parties. The lease 
contract, not a "Lease Processing Sheet," is what governs the duties and obligations of 
the parties. (See T.T. at 103). 
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by consideration. Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and given in 
exchange for a promise." Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 
1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). In short, Colonial did not consent to cancellation of the 
lease, either expressly or impliedly. 
H. A Thirtv-Dav Trial Period Was Not Part of the Lease 
Contract, 
Cumberledge argues that the lease contract never became legally effective 
because Colonial failed to satisfy a condition precedent — a thirty-day trial period of 
the equipment. Appellants' Brief at 16. The thirty-day trial period was a 
representation made by the vendor, Bottomline, NOT Colonial, and therefore is not 
binding upon Colonial. See Shire Development v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 
221, 223 (Utah App. 1990)(not liable upon contract except those who are parties to 
it)(citing Wing v.Martin. 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984)(Idaho 1984)(lessees, who were 
not parties to prior lease, were not in privity with former lessees, and therefore, could 
not sue to enforce terms of prior lease). 
The lease contract between Colonial and Cumberledge is clear, it is immediately 
effective upon acceptance. There is no provision for a thirty-day trial period. It 
expressly contains the entire agreement between the parties, and disclaims all 
warranties. In fact, Bottomline's representation was allegedly made after the lease 
contract was signed by the parties. (T.T. at 59-60). Evidence of a thirty-day trial 
period would therefore be inconsistent with the written contract and would be 
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inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. Hicks v. Bush. 180 N.E.2d 425, 427-28 
(N. Y. 1962)(parol evidence rule not violated where oral condition was merely a further 
condition to one specified in writing and did not contradict terms of the writing and 
was not irreconcilable with writing).11 Furthermore, "whether or not there was such 
a separate agreement, not in contradiction of the written document, is for the trier of 
fact to determine." FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy. Inc.. 617 P.2d 327, 329 
(Utah 1980)(also cited in Appellants' Brief at 17). Colonial is not bound by an alleged 
thirty-day trial period offered by the vendor, Bottomline. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Barrett properly found that Cumberledge accepted the leased equipment 
and was accordingly irrevocably obliged to comply with the lease contract. Legally, 
Cumberledge could not reject the equipment, once acceptance has already taken place. 
The judgment entered by Judge Barrett should be affirmed. 
MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Colonial hereby moves this Court for an order awarding its reasonable attorneys 
fees and costs on appeal. See Gardner v. Madsen, 949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah App. 
1997)(party awarded trial costs and attorneys fees below pursuant to terms of contract, 
1
 Appellants rely on this case in their brief (at page 16), however, Appellants fail 
to recognize that to allow a 30-day trial period would be inconsistent with, and 
contradict, the signed lease contract, and therefore evidence of the existence of such a 
condition precedent would be inadmissible against Colonial. 
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shall be awarded attorneys fees and costs if that party prevails on appeal). Colonial 
was awarded its attorneys fees and costs below, consistent with the lease agreement. 
(R. at 60). Likewise, this Court should award Colonial attorneys fees and costs on 
appeal, and should remand the case for the limited purpose of determining those 
amounts. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q day of September, 1998. 
SCALLEY & READING 
[/\p4Atsh^ 
Wesley D. Hftitchins 
J. Bruce Reading 
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM "A" (DETERMINATIVE STATUTES) 
ADDENDUM "B" (JUDGE'S RULING) 
ADDENDUM "C" (TRIALEXHIBITS-LEASE DOCUMENTS) 
Tab A 
70A-2a-101 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Section 
70A-2a-503. Modification or impairment of 
rights and remedies. 
70A-2a-504. Liquidation of damages. 
70A-2a-505. Cancellation and termination 
and effect of cancellation, ter-
mination, rescission, or fraud 
on rights and remedies. 
70A-2a-506. Statute of limitations. 
70A-2a-507. Proof of market rent — Time 
and place. 
70A-2a-508. Lessee's remedies. 
70A-2a-509. Lessee's rights on improper de-
livery — Rightful rejection. 
70A-2a-510. Installment lease contracts — 
Rejection and default. 
70A-2a-511. Merchant lessee's duties as to 
rightfully rejected goods. 
70A-2a-512. Lessee's duties as to rightfully 
rejected goods. 
70A-2a-513. Cure by lessor of improper ten-
der or delivery — Replace-
ment. 
70A-2a-514. Waiver of lessee's objections. 
70A-2a-515. Acceptance of goods. 
70A-2a-516. Effect of acceptance of goods — 
Notice of default — Burden of 
establishing default after ac-
ceptance — Notice of claim or 
litigation to person answer-
able over. 
70A-2a-517. Revocation of acceptance of 
goods. 
Section 
70A-2a-518. Cover — Substitute goods. 
70A-2a-519. Lessee's damages for nondeliv-
ery, repudiation, default, and 
breach of warranty in regard 
to accepted goods. 
70A-2a-520. Lessee's incidental and conse-
quential damages. 
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PARTI 
SHORT TITLE, DEFINITIONS, OPTIONS 
70A-2a-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the Uniform Commercial Code — Leases. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-101, enacted by 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 3. 
Uniform Laws. — Other states that have 
adopted Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial 
Code governing leases are Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
70A-2a-102. Scope. 
This chapter applies to any transaction, regardless of form, that creates a 
lease. 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, South Dakota, Tennesse, Texas, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-102, enacted by 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 4. 
110 
LEASES 70A-2a-103 
70A-2a-103. Definitions — Index of definitions. 
(1) In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: 
(a) "Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person, who in good 
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the 
ownership rights or security interest or leasehold interest of a third party 
in the goods, buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of 
selling goods of that kind, but does not include a pawnbroker. "Buying" 
may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or 
unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under 
a preexisting contract for sale, but does not include a transfer in bulk, or 
as security for, or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt. 
(b) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the lease 
contract for default by the other party. 
(c) "Commercial unit" means a unit of goods which by commercial usage 
is a single whole for purposes of lease, and the division of which materially 
impairs its character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit 
may be a single article, such as a machine, or a set of articles, such as a 
suite of furniture or a line of machinery, or a quantity, such as a gross or 
carload, or any other unit treated in use or in the relevant market as a 
single whole. 
(d) "Conforming goods or performance under a lease contract" means 
goods or performance that are in accordance with the obligations under 
the lease contract. 
(e) "Consumer lease" means a lease that a lessor, regularly engaged in 
the business of leasing or selling, makes to a lessee, who is an individual 
and who takes under the lease primarily for a personal, family, or 
household purpose. 
(f) "Fault" means wrongful act, omission, breach, or default. 
(g) "Finance lease" means a lease in which: 
(i) the lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply the goods; 
(ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the right to possession and use 
of the goods in connection with the lease; and 
(iii) one of the following occurs: 
(A) the lessee receives a copy of the contract by which the 
lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the 
goods before signing the lease contract; 
(B) the lessee's approval of the contract by which the lessor 
acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods 
is a condition to effectiveness of the lease contract; 
(C) the lessee, before signing the lease contract, receives an 
accurate and complete statement designating the promises and 
warranties, and any disclaimers of warranties, limitations, or 
modifications of remedies, or liquidated damages, including those 
of a third party, such as the manufacturer of the goods, provided 
to the lessor by the person supplying the goods in connection with 
or as part of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods 
or the right to possession and use of the goods; or 
(D) if the lease is not a consumer lease, the lessor, before the 
lessee signs the lease contract, informs the lessee in writing: 
(I) of the identity of the person supplying the goods to the 
lessor, unless the lessee has selected that person and directed 
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the lessor to acquire the goods or the right to possession and 
use of the goods from that person; 
(II) that the lessee is entitled under this chapter to the 
promises and warranties, including those of any third party, 
provided to the lessor by the person supplying the goods in 
connection with or as part of the contract by which the lessor 
acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the 
goods; and 
(III) that the lessee may communicate with the person 
supplying the goods to the lessor and receive an accurate and 
complete statement of those promises and warranties, in-
cluding any disclaimers and limitations of them or of rem-
edies. 
(h) "Goods" means all things that are movable at the time of identifi-
cation to the lease contract, or are fixtures. The term does not include 
money, documents, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, general intan-
gibles, or minerals or the like, including oil and gas, before extraction. The 
term also includes the unborn young of animals. 
(i) "Installment lease contract" means a lease contract that authorizes 
or requires the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, 
even though the lease contract contains a clause stating "each delivery is 
a separate lease" or its equivalent. 
(j) "Lease" means a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods 
for a term, in return for consideration. Unless the context clearly indicates 
otherwise, the term includes a sublease. But a sale, including a sale on 
approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation of a security interest 
is not a lease. 
(k) "Lease agreement" with respect to the lease, means the bargain of 
the lessor and the lessee in fact as found in their language or by 
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage 
of trade or course of performance as provided in this chapter. Unless the 
context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease agree-
ment. 
(1) "Lease contract" means the total legal obligation that results from 
the lease agreement as affected by this chapter and any other applicable 
rules of law. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term 
includes a sublease contract. 
(m) "Leasehold interest" means the interest of the lessor or the lessee 
under a lease contract. 
(n) "Lessee" means a person who acquires the right to possession and 
use of goods under a lease. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, 
the term includes a sublessee. 
(o) "Lessee in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good 
faith and without knowledge that the lease to him is in violation of the 
ownership rights, security interest, or leasehold interest of a third party in 
the goods, leases in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling 
or leasing goods of that kind, but does not include a pawnbroker. "Leasing" 
may be for cash or by exchange of other property, or on secured or 
unsecured credit, and includes receiving goods or documents of title under 
a preexisting lease contract. "Leasing" does not include a transfer in bulk 
or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt. 
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(p) "Lessor" means a person who transfers the right to possession and 
use of goods under a lease. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, 
the term includes a sublessor. 
(q) "Lessor's residual interest" means the lessor's interest in the goods 
after expiration, termination, or cancellation of the lease contract. 
(r) "Lien" means a charge against or interest in goods to secure payment 
of a debt or performance of an obligation, but the term does not include a 
security interest. 
(s) "Lot" means a parcel or single article that is the subject matter of a 
separate lease or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient to perform the 
lease contract. 
(t) "Merchant lessee" means a lessee that is a merchant with respect to 
goods of the kind subject to the lease. 
(u) "Present value" means the amount as of a date certain of one or more 
sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain. The discount is 
determined by the interest rate specified by the parties if the rate was not 
manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction was entered into; 
otherwise, the discount is determined by a commercially reasonable rate 
that takes into account the facts and circumstances of each case at the 
time the transaction was entered into. 
(v) "Purchase" includes taking by sale, lease, mortgage, security inter-
est, pledge, gift, or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in 
goods. 
(w) "Sublease" means a lease of goods, the right to possession and use of 
which was acquired by the lessor as a lessee under an existing lease. 
(x) "Supplier" means a person from whom a lessor buys or leases goods 
to be leased under a finance lease. 
(y) "Supply contract" means a contract under which a lessor buys or 
leases goods to be leased. 
(z) "Termination" occurs when either party, pursuant to a power created 
by agreement or law, puts an end to the lease contract otherwise than for 
default. 
(2) Other definitions applying to this chapter and the sections in which they 
appear are: 
(a) "Accessions," Section 70A-2a-310; 
(b) "Construction mortgage," Section 70A-2a-309; 
(c) "Encumbrance," Section 70A-2a-309; 
(d) "Fixtures," Section 70A-2a-309; 
(e) "Fixture filing," Section 70A-2a-309; and 
(f) "Purchase money lease," Section 70A-2a-309. 
(3) The following definitions in other chapters apply to this chapter: 
(a) "Account," Section 70A-9-106; 
(b) "Between merchants," Section 70A-2-104; 
(c) "Buyer," Section 70A-2-103; 
(d) "Chattel paper," Section 70A-9-105; 
(e) "Consumer goods," Section 70A-9-109; 
(f) "Document," Section 70A-9-105; 
(g) "Entrusting," Section 70A-2-403; 
(h) "General intangibles," Section 70A-9-106; 
(i) "Good faith," Section 70A-2-103; 
(j) "Instrument," Section 70A-9-105; 
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goods if under an installment lease contract the value of the whole lease 
contract is substantially impaired as provided in Section 70A-2a-510: 
(a) terminate the lease contract as provided in Subsection 70A-2a-
505(2); or 
(b) except in a finance lease, modify the lease contract by accepting the 
available quota in substitution, with due allowance from the rent payable 
for the balance of the lease term for the deficiency but without further 
right against the lessor. 
(2) If, after receipt of a notification from the lessor under Section 70A-2a-
405, the lessee fails so to modify the lease agreement within a reasonable time 
not exceeding 30 days, the lease contract lapses with respect to any deliveries 
affected. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-406, enacted by 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 48. 
70A-2a-407. Irrevocable promises — Finance leases. 
(1) In the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, the lessee's 
promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon 
the lessee's acceptance of the goods. 
(2) A promise that has become irrevocable and independent under Subsec-
tion (1): 
(a) is effective and enforceable between the parties, and by or against 
third parties including assignees of the parties; and 
(b) is not subject to cancellation, termination, modification, repudia-
tion, excuse, or substitution without the consent of the party to whom the 
promise runs. 
(3) This section does not affect the validity under any other law of a 
covenant in any lease contract making the lessee's promises irrevocable and 
independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-407, enacted by ment, effective July 1, 1993, substituted "does 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 49; 1993, ch. 237, § 12. not" for "shall not" near the beginning of Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- section (3) 
PART 5 
DEFAULT, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, ACCEPTANCE 
OF GOODS, LESSOR RIGHTS 
70A-2a-501. Default — Procedure. 
(1) Whether the lessor or the lessee is in default under a lease contract is 
determined by the lease agreement and this chapter. 
(2) If the lessor or the lessee is in default under the lease contract, the party 
seeking enforcement has rights and remedies as provided in this chapter and, 
except as limited by this chapter, as provided in the lease agreement. 
(3) If the lessor or the lessee is in default under the lease contract, the party 
seeking enforcement may reduce the party's claim to judgment, or otherwise 
enforce the lease contract by self-help or any available judicial procedure or 
nonjudicial procedure, including administrative proceeding, arbitration, or the 
like, in accordance with this chapter. 
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section (1Kb), added Subsection (l)(d) and 
made related stylistic changes, and rewrote 
Subsection (3). 
70A-2a-509. Lessee's rights on improper delivery — 
Rightful rejection. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 70A-2a-510 on default in installment 
lease contracts, if the goods or the tender or delivery fail in any respect to 
conform to the lease contract, the lessee may reject or accept the goods or 
accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest of the goods. 
(2) Rejection of goods is ineffective unless it is within a reasonable time after 
tender or delivery of the goods and the lessee seasonably notifies the lessor. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-509, enacted by 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 58. 
70A-2a-510. Installment lease contracts — Rejection and 
default. 
(1) Under an installment lease contract, a lessee may reject any delivery 
that is nonconforming if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of 
that delivery and cannot be cured or the nonconformity is a defect in the 
required documents; but if the nonconformity does not fall within Subsection 
(2) and the lessor or the supplier gives adequate assurance of its cure, the 
lessee must accept that delivery. 
(2) Whenever nonconformity or default with respect to one or more deliver-
ies substantially impairs the value of the installment lease contract as a whole, 
there is a default with respect to the whole. But, the aggrieved party reinstates 
the installment lease contract as a whole if the aggrieved party accepts a 
nonconforming delivery without seasonably notifying of cancellation or brings 
an action with respect only to past deliveries or demands performance as to 
future deliveries. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-510, enacted by 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 59. 
70A-2a-511. Merchant lessee's duties as to rightfully re-
jected goods. 
(1) Subject to any security interest of a lessee as provided in Subsection 
70A-2a-508(5), if a lessor or a supplier has no agent or place of business at the 
market of rejection, a merchant lessee, after rejection of goods in his possession 
or control, shall follow any reasonable instructions received from the lessor or 
the supplier with respect to the goods. In the absence of those instructions, a 
merchant lessee shall make reasonable efforts to sell, lease, or otherwise 
dispose of the goods for the lessor's account if they threaten to decline in value 
speedily. Instructions are not reasonable if on demand indemnity for expenses 
is not forthcoming. 
(2) If a merchant lessee under Subsection (1) or any other lessee under 
Section 70A-2a-512 disposes of goods, he is entitled to reimbursement either 
from the lessor or the supplier or out of the proceeds for reasonable expenses 
of caring for and disposing of the goods and, if the expenses include no 
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70A-2a-514. Waiver of lessee's objections. 
(1) In rejecting goods, a lessee's failure to state a particular defect that is 
ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes the lessee from relying on the 
defect to justify rejection or to establish default: 
(a) if, stated seasonably, the lessor or the supplier could have cured it as 
provided in Section 70A-2a-513; or 
(b) between merchants if the lessor or the supplier after rejection has 
made a request in writing for a full and final written statement of all 
defects on which the lessee proposes to rely. 
(2) A lessee's failure to reserve rights when paying rent or other consider-
ation against documents precludes recovery of the payment for defects appar-
ent on the face of the documents. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-514, enacted by 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 63. 
70A-2a-515. Acceptance of goods. 
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs after: 
(a) the lessee has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods and 
the lessee signifies or acts with respect to the goods in a manner that 
signifies to the lessor or the supplier that the goods are conforming or that 
the lessee will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity; or 
(b) the lessee fails to make an effective rejection of the goods as 
provided in Subsection 70A-2a-509(2). 
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire 
unit. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-515, enacted by 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 64. 
70A-2a-516. Effect of acceptance of goods — Notice of 
default — Burden of establishing default after 
acceptance — Notice of claim or litigation to 
person answerable over. 
(1) A lessee must pay rent for any goods accepted in accordance with the 
lease contract, with due allowance for goods rightfully rejected or not deliv-
ered. 
(2) A lessee's acceptance of goods precludes rejection of the goods accepted. 
In the case of a finance lease other than a consumer lease in which the supplier 
assisted in the preparation of the lease contract or participated in negotiating 
the terms of the lease contract with the lessor, if made with knowledge of a 
nonconformity, acceptance cannot be revoked because of it. In any other case, 
if made with knowledge of a nonconformity, acceptance cannot be revoked 
because of it unless the acceptance was on the reasonable assumption that the 
nonconformity would be seasonably cured. Acceptance does not of itself impair 
any other remedy provided by this chapter or the lease agreement for 
nonconformity. 
(3) If a tender has been accepted: 
(a) within a reasonable time after the lessee discovers or should have 
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discovered any default, the lessee shall notify the lessor, or be barred from 
any remedy against the lessor, and, in addition, in the case of a finance 
lease, the lessee shall notify the supplier or be barred from any remedy 
against the supplier; 
(b) within a reasonable time after the lessee receives notice of litigation 
for infringement or the like, as provided in Section 70A-2a-211, the lessee 
shall notify the lessor or be barred from any remedy for liability estab-
lished by the litigation; and 
(c) the burden is on the lessee to establish any default. 
(4) If a lessee is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for which 
a lessor or a supplier is answerable over, the following apply: 
(a) The lessee may give the lessor or the supplier, or both, written notice 
of the litigation. If the notice states that the lessor or the supplier may 
come in and defend and that if the lessor or the supplier does not do so, he 
will be bound in any action against him by the lessee by any determination 
of fact common to the two litigations, unless the lessor or the supplier, 
after seasonable receipt of the notice, does come in and so defend. 
(b) The lessor or the supplier may demand in writing that the lessee 
turn over control of the litigation, including settlement if the claim is one 
for infringement or the like as provided in Section 70A-2a-211, or else be 
barred from any remedy. If the demand states that the lessor or the 
supplier agrees to bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, 
then, unless the lessee after seasonable receipt of the demand does turn 
over control, the lessee is so barred. 
(5) Subsections (3) and (4) apply to any obligation of a lessee to hold the 
lessor or the supplier harmless against infringement or the like as provided in 
Section 70A-2a-211. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-516, enacted by ment, effective July 1, 1993, made stylistic 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 65; 1993, ch. 237, § 17. changes throughout the section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
70A-2a-517. Revocation of acceptance of goods. 
(1) A lessee may revoke acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose 
nonconformity substantially impairs its value to the lessee if the lessee has 
accepted it: 
(a) except in the case of a finance lease, on the reasonable assumption 
that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably 
cured; or 
(b) without discovery of the nonconformity if the lessee's acceptance 
was reasonably induced either by the lessor's assurances or, except in the 
case of a finance lease, by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance. 
(2) Except in the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, a lessee 
may revoke acceptance of a lot or commercial unit if the lessor defaults under 
the lease contract and the default substantially impairs the value of that lot or 
commercial unit to the lessee. 
(3) If the lease agreement so provides, the lessee may revoke acceptance of 
a lot or commercial unit because of other defaults by the lessor. 
(4) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the 
lessee discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any 
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substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by the 
nonconformity. Revocation is not effective until the lessee notifies the lessor. 
(5) A lessee who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to 
the goods involved as if the lessee had rejected them. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-517, enacted by (2) and (3), redesignated former Subsections (2) 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 66; 1993, ch. 237, § 18. and (3) as Subsections (4) and (5), and made a 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- stylistic change in Subsection (1). 
ment, effective July 1,1993, added Subsections 
70A-2a-518. Cover — Substitute goods. 
(1) After default by a lessor under the lease contract of the type described in 
Section 70A-2a-508, or if agreed after other default by the lessor, the lessee 
may cover by making amy purchase or lease of or contract to purchase or lease 
goods in substitution for those due from the lessor. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided with respect to damages liquidated in the 
lease agreement as provided in Section 70A-2a-504 or otherwise determined 
pursuant to agreement of the parties as provided in Subsection 70A-1-102(3) 
and Section 70A-2a-503, if a lessee's cover is by lease agreement substantially 
similar to the original lease agreement and the lease agreement is made in 
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, the lessee may recover 
from the lessor as damages: 
(a) the present value, as of the date of the commencement of the term of 
the new lease agreement, of the rent under the new lease agreement 
applicable to that period of the new lease term that is comparable to the 
then remaining term of the original lease agreement, minus the present 
value as of the same date of the total rent for the then remaining lease 
term of the original lease agreement; and 
(b) any incidental or consequential damages less expenses saved in 
consequence of the lessor's default. 
(3) If a lessee's cover is by lease agreement that qualifies for treatment 
under Subsection (2), the lessee may elect to proceed under Subsection (2) or 
Section 70A-2a-519. If a lessee's cover is by lease agreement that for any 
reason does not qualify for treatment under Subsection (2), or is by purchase 
or otherwise, the lessee may recover from the lessor under Section 70A-2a-519 
as if the lessee had elected not to cover. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-518, enacted by formerly prescribed as recoverable damages 
L. 1990, ch. 197, § 67; 1993, ch. 237, § 19. the present value of the difference between to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- the total rent of the new lease and the total rent 
ment, effective July 1, 1993, inserted "or if for the remaining lease term, and made stylis-
agreed after other default by the lessor" in tic changes throughout the section. 
Subsection (1), rewrote Subsection (2)(a), which 
70A-2a-519. Lessee's damages for nondelivery, repudia-
tion, default, and breach of warranty in regard 
to accepted goods. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided with respect to damages liquidated in the 
lease agreement as provided in Section 70A-2a-504 or otherwise determined 
pursuant to agreement of the parties as provided in Subsection 70A-1-102(3) 
and Section 70A-2a-503, if a lessee elects not to cover or a lessee elects to cover 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JWCJR CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Case NO. 970001160 
JUDGE'S RULING 
-o0o-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 24th day of 
November, 1997, the above-entitled matter came on for 
hearing before the HONORABLE WILLIAM M. BARRETT, sitting 
as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of this 
cause, and that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Ji BRUCE READING 
Attorney at Law 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BILL MORRISON 
Attorney at Law 
COPY 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 26&-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH S41Q7 
1 J P.R.0 . C E E P I N g S 
2 
3 I THE COURT; We're here on the case of 
4 Colonial Pacific Leasing Corporation versus JWCJR 
5 | Corporation, d/b/a Jack's Southwest Collision Repair and 
6 John W. Cumberledge, Jr., Case No. 970001160. 
7 • Excuse me. I've had a cold all week last week, 
I'm right on the tail end of it, but I'm having some 
trouble. 
MR. READING: Well, if it's all right 
with you, Judge, I won't kiss you today. 
THE COURT: All right. I would 
13 j appreciate that. 
This is a case that I'd like to make some 
social commentary on, but I'm going to bite my tongue and 
16 I not say anything. 
I've made my decision, I think. I've reviewed 
the trial brief submitted by Mr. Morrison and the Uniform 
Commercial Code material provided by Mr. Reading and 
based upon the evidence that I heard and the law, I want 
to make the following findings of fact and conclusions of 
law: 
Number One: Plaintiff and defendant, JWCJR 
Corporation, entered into a lease agreement for certain 
computer equipment as set forth therein, as reflected in 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
14 
15 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Exhibit 1. 
Two: Defendant, John W. Cumberledge, Jr., 
signed a guarantee on June 9, 1993. 
Three: Mr. Cumberledge, as president, selected 
5 I the computer equipment which was obtained from Bottom 
5 Line. The equipment was delivered to the company a few 
7 days after the lease was signed as set forth in Exhibit 
8 2# 
9 Four: The computer equipment was set up by Mr. 
-jQ Cumberledge was not able to get it to function properly. 
11 He had Bottom Line pick up the computer equipment at some 
later date. 
Five: Mr. Cumberledge contacted Colonial 
Pacific Leasing and advised them of the problem. Two to 
three weeks later, he contacted Colonial again and 
advised them of the problem. He was under the impression 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 that if he didn't hear from Colonial, everything was okay 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
regarding the lease. 
Six: Mr. Cumberledge did not hear from 
Colonial for about two years when it initiated this case 
against the corporation and himself for failing to make 
the payments on the lease. 
I'm sure there are other facts that support 
24 this finding and the following—these findings and the 
25 following conclusions of law: 
3 
10 
11 
1 Number One: Defendants entered into a legally 
2 binding lease agreement with the plaintiff, which in 
3 accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code was a 
4 financed lease, the lease terms and the U.C.C. governs 
5 the parties' rights in this case. 
Q Two: Defendants had a duty to comply with the 
7 terms of the lease agreement, which they failed to do. 
g Three: Defendant, JWCJR Corporation breached 
g the lease agreement by failing to make the lease 
payments. John W. Cumberledge, Jr. was the guarantor of 
the lease. 
12 Based upon the foregoing—based upon the 
foregoing—foregoing, judgment is awarded in favor of 
plaintiff against defendants for the sum of $16,874.30 
plus costs and attorney's fees. 
Mr. Reading, I would ask that you prepare 
17 I appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
submit them to Mr. Morrison and then to me. 
MR. READING: I'll be happy to do 
that, your Honor. 
MR. MORRISON: Thank you, your Honor, 
22 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
23 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
24 
25 
* * • 
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1 TRANSCRIBERS CERTIFICATE 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss* 
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
5 That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
g Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded tape of the within 
j matter and under his supervision have transcribed the 
same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered 
8 from 1 to 4, inclusive, to the best of my ability 
constitute a full, true and correct transcription, except 
9 where it is indicated the Tape Recorded Court Proceedings 
I were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of eithet party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 1st day of 
September, 1998. 
W(MtC \J? 
Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day 
of September, 1998. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P. SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 
MURRAY. UT M107 
COMMISSfON EXPIRES 
DEC. 4,2001 
STATE OF UTAH Notary Public ' "' 
( S E A L ) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically 
recorded tape of the within matter and caused the same to 
be transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing 
pages, numbered from 1 to 4, inclusive, to the best of my 
knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated, at Salt Lake City, Utah, this l s t day of 
September, 1998. 
i NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P. SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 
MURRAY. UT 84107 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC.4.2001 
STATE OF UTAH {^z^^L-Notary Public 
( S E A L ) 
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W Colonial Pacific Leasing 
A Pitney Bowes Company 
7659 MOHAWK STREET P O BOX 1100 
TUALATIN OREGON 97062 1100 
TELEPHONE (503) 692-9744 WATS (800) 444 1738 
LEASE NUMBER 
Ofru&^&c 
J.ILC.J. R. Corpo7it^G A L NAME AND ADDRESS 0 F LESSEE 
dba Jack's Southwest Collison Repair 
I B East Center Street 
Midvalt ijdffijTiiWtoi?) SEVERALLY RESPONSIBLE 
B^ipop i l : , En f i%i^?r^. ( C O M P L E T E A D D R E S S ) 
188 South m West 1450 
Salt Laki City, UT SAICI 
A169552 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION MODEL CATALOG SERIAL OR OTHER IDENTIFICATION 
E 
Q L 
U E 
I A 
P S 
M E 
§D 
J 
See Exhibit "A" Attached Hereto And Made A Part Hereof 
EQUIPMENT 
LOCATION IF 
DIFFERENT 
STREET ADDRESS-
CITY .COUNTY. STATE ZIP-
mw TERMS 
AMOUNT OF EACH RENTAL PAYMENT 
(PLUS SALES TAX, IF APPLICABLE) 
MONTHLY 
OTHER/SPECIF1 
TERM OF LEASE 
;yo OF MONTHS) 
_&_ 
NO OF RENT 
PAYMENTS JL 
SECURITY 
DEPOSIT t£75. 
/ l e ! ^ U ^ I o r T B & L i l l o ' r T ^ l s ^ l s l l e 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF LEASE 
1 LEASE Lessee hereby lea^^lrorrrlJe'Ss'or'arftl ^§s* "r7§3se l6Tesse the personal property described above, together with any attachments replacement parts substitutions additions repairs or accessories 
now or hereafter incorporated in or affixed to it (hereinafter referred to as the "Equipment") 
2 ACCEPTANCE OF EQUIPMENT Lessee agrees to inspect the Equipment and to execute the Acknowledgement and Acceptance of Equipment by Lessee attached below after the Equipment has been delivered 
and after Lessee is satisfied that the Equipment is satisfactory in every respect Lessee hereby authorizes Lessor to insert in this Lease serial numbers or other identifying data with respect to the Equipment 
3 DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND CLAIMS, LIMITATION OF REMEDIES THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES BY OR ON BEHALF OF LESSOR LESSEE ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES BY HIS 
SIGNATURE BELOW AS FOLLOWS (A) LESSOR MAKES NO WARRANTIES EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED AS TO THE CONDITION OF THE EQUIPMENT, ITS MERCHANTABILITY, ITS FITNESS OR 
SUITABILITY FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ITS DESIGN, ITS CONDITION, ITS CAPACITY, ITS QUALITY, OR WITH RESPECT TO ANY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EQUIPMENT, (B) LESSEE HAS 
FULLY INSPECTED THE EQUIPMENT WHICH IT HAS REQUESTED LESSOR TO ACQUIRE AND LEASE TO LESSEE, AND THE EQUIPMENT IS IN GOOD CONDITION AND TO LESSEE S COMPLETE 
SATISFACTION, (C) LESSEE LEASES THE EQUIPMENT ' AS IS AND WITH ALL FAULTS, (D) LESSEE SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE EQUIPMENT IS LEASED TO LESSEE SOLELY 
FOR COMMERCIAL OR BUSINESS PURPOSES AND NOT FOR PERSONAL, FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD, OR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES, (E) IF THE EQUIPMENT IS NOT PROPERTY INSTALLED, DOES 
NOT OPERATE AS REPRESENTED OR WARRANTED BY THE SUPPLIER OR MANUFACTURER, OR IS UNSATISFACTORY FOR ANY REASON, REGARDLESS OF CAUSE OR CONSEQUENCE, 
LESSEE S ONLY REMEDY, IF ANY, SHALL BE AGAINSTTHE SUPPLIER OR MANUFACTURER OF THE EQUIPMENT AND NOT AGAINST LESSOR, (F) PROVIDED LESSEE IS NOT IN DEFAULT UNDER 
THIS LEASE, LESSOR ASSIGNS TO LESSEE ANY WARRANTIES MADE BY THE SUPPLIER OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE EQUIPMENT, (G) LESSEE SHALL HAVE NO REMEDY FOR 
CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES AGAINST LESSOR, AND (H) NO DEFECT, DAMAGE, OR UNFITNESS OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL RELIEVE LESSEE OF THE 
OBLIGATION TO PAY RENT OR RELIEVE LESSEE OF ANY OTHER OBLIGATION UNDER THIS LEASE 
The parties have specifically negotiated and agreed to the foregoing paragraph 
4 STATUTORY FINANCE LEASE Lessee agrees and acknowledges that it is the intent of both parties to this Lease that it qualify as a statutory finance lease under Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Oregon Lessee acknowledges and 
agrees that Lessee has selected both (1) the Equipment and (2) the supplier from whom Lessor is to purchase the Equipment Lessee acknowledges that Lessor has not participated in any way in Lessee s selection of the Equipment or of the supplier and Lessor 
has not selected manufactured or supplied the Equipment LESSEE ACKNOWLEDGES EITHER (A) THAT LESSEE HAS REVIEWED AND APPROVED ANY WRITTEN SUPPLY CONTRACT COVERING THE EQUIPMENT PURCHASED FROM THE SUPPLIER 
THEREOF FOR LEASE TO LESSEE OR (B) THAT LESSOR HAS INFORMED OR ADVISED LESSEE IN WRITING EITHER PREVIOUSLY OR BY THIS LEASE THAT LESSEE MAY HAVE RIGHTS UNDER THE SUPPLY CONTRACT EVIDENCING THE 
LESSOR S PURCHASE OF THE EQUIPMENT FROM THE SUPPLIER CHOSEN BY LESSEE AND THAT LESSEE SHOULD CONTACT THE SUPPLIER OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR A DESCRIPTION OF ANY SUCH RIGHTS 
5 ASSIGNMENT BY LESSEE PROHIBITED WITHOUT LESSOR S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT LESSEE SHALL NOT ASSIGN THIS LEASE OR SUBLEASE THE EQUIPMENT OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN OR PLEDGE OR TRANSFER THIS LEASE 
OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF LESSEE S INTEREST IN THE EQUIPMENT COVERED HEREBY 
6 RENTAL PAYMENTS Lessee agrees to pay the total rent equal to the "Amount of Each Rental Payment" multiplied by the number of payments specified in "No of Rent Payments " Rent Payments will be made in advance and periodically as specified in "Terms" 
above Rent Payments shall be made by Lessee at P 0 Box 2090 Portland Oregon 97208 2090 or as otherwise directed by Lessor Lessee shall not abate set off deduct any amount or reduce any payment for any reason The first payment shall be due on 
the date of acceptance of the Equipment by Lessee and subsequent payments shall be due on the same day of each succeeding month throughout the term of the Lease 
THIS LEASE IS NOT CANCELABLE OR TERMINABLE BY LESSEE 
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS WHICH ARE A PART OF THIS LEASE 
LESSEE UNDERSTANDSANDACKNOWLEDGESTHATNOBROKERORSUPPLIER NOR ANY SALESMAN BROKER OR AGENT OF ANY BROKER OR SUPPLIER IS AN AGENT OF LESSOR NO BROKER OR SUPPLIER NOR ANY SALESMAN BROKER 
OR AGENT OF ANY BROKER OR SUPPLIER IS AUTHORIZED TO WAIVE OR ALTER ANY TERM OR CONDITION OF THIS LEASE AND NO REPRESENTATION AS TO THE EQUIPMENT OR ANY OTHER MATTER BY THE BROKER OR SUPPLIER NOR 
ANY SALESMAN BROKER OR AGENT OF ANY BROKER OR SUPPLIER SHALL IN ANY WAY AFFECT LESSEE S DUTY TO PAY THE RENTALS AND TO PERFORM LESSEE S OBLIGATIONS SET FORTH IN THIS LEASE 
7 CHOICE OF LAW, JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF LITIGATION THIS LEASE WAS EXECUTED IN THE STATE OF OREGON (BY LESSOR HAVING COUNTERSIGNED IT AT ITS PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN TUALATIN WASHINGTON COUNTY OREGON) 
AND IT IS TO BE PERFORMED IN THE STATE OF OREGON BY REASON OF THE PAYMENTS REQUIRED TO BE MADE TO LESSOR IN OREGON THIS LEASE SHALL IN ALL RESPECTS BE INTERPRETED AND ALL TRANSACTIONS THEREUNDER, 
AND ALL RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES HERETO SHALL BE DETERMINED AND GOVERNED AS TO VALIDITY INTERPRETATION ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECT BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF OREGON EXCEPT FOR LOCAL 
RECORDING STATUTES LESSEE HEREBY AGREES THAT ALL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS ARISING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM THIS LEASE MAY BE LITIGATED AT THE ELECTION OF LESSOR ONLY IN COUNTIES HAVING SITES 
WITHIN THE STATE OF OR£GQN|4.ESS5E A Wjj&T^ATiF'ANY ACTION IS BROUGHT TO ENFORCE ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS LEASE BY EITHER PARTY WASHINGTON COUNTY SHALL BE A PROPER PLACE FOR THE TRIAL OF 
SUCH ACTION 
ba Jack's Southwest Collison Repair 
Pledge, J^ProiidifW-pf-
LESSOR: COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING CORPORATION 
BY<6tfe{ )V^ . T s f f u ^ P ^ D A T E ^ - fc^ 
GUARANTY 
This Guaranty is executed for the benefit oi Colonial Pacific Leasing Corporation its successors and assigns to induce Lessor to enter into the above Lease w th the above name Lessee 
WHEREAS Guarantor has an interest I nancial or otherwise in Lessee and it is to the benefit of Guarantor that Lessor enter into the Lease with Lessee and Guarantor has read the proposed Lease in full and finds the terms of said Lease acceptable and in 
recognition that Lessor would be unwilling to enter into the Lease without the Guaranty hereinafter set forth and in recognition of Lessors reliance upon the Guaranty in entering into the Lease 
NOW THEREFORE in order to induce Lessor to enter into the Lease Guarantor jointly and severally unconditionally guaranties to Lessor the prompt payment of all Rental Payments and other sums to be paid and the faithful and full performance by Lessee 
of all terms and conditions of the Lease In the event of default by Lessee or failure to faithfully perform any of the terms or conditions required of Lessee under the Lease or in the event of failure of Lessee to make any or all payments of money required of it under 
the Lease Guarantor jointly and severally unconditionally promises to pay to Lessor in lawful money of the United States all sums at any time due and unpaid under the Lease plus costs of collection including reasonable attorney s fees with or without tnal 
and upon appeal and review 
The obligations of Guarantor hereunder are joirt and several and are independent of the obi gations of Lessee under the Lease and a separate action or actions may be brought against Guarantor whether action is brought against Lessee or whether Lessee be 
pined in any action or actions the liability of Guarantor hereunder being primary Guarantor hereby waives the benefit of any suretyship defenses affecting its liability hereunder or the enforcement hereof 
Guarantor authorizes Lessor without notice or demand and without affecting Guarantor s liability hereunder from time to time to renew extend accelerate or otherwise change the payment terms or other terms of the Lease or any part thereof Lessor may without 
notice assign this Guaranty in whole or in part 
Guarantor hereby waives any right to require Lessor to (a) proceed against Lessee (b) proceed against or exhaust any security held by Lessor or (c) pursue any other remedy in Lessor s power Guarantor waives any defense arising by reason of any defense 
of Lessee or by reason of the cessation from any cause whatsoever of the liability of Lessee under the Lease Guarantor waives any and all demands for performance notices of nonperformance or default and notices of cancellation or forfeiture Lessor may 
apply all proceeds received from Lessee or others to such part of Lessee s indebtedness as Lessor may deem appropriate without consulting Guarantor and without prejudice to or in any way limiting or lessening the liability of Guarantor under this Guaranty 
If Lessee is a corporation the undersigned warrant and epresent that they are stockholders directors or officers and/or are financially or otherw se nterested in Lessee and if married the r mar tal communities are so interested 
This Guaranty shall not be affected or discharged by the death of the undersigned but shall bind Guarantor s heirs and personal representatives and shall inure to the benefit of anV successors or assigns of Lessor 
This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between Lessor and Guarantor No oral or written representation not contained herein shall in any way affect this Guaranty which shall not be modified except by the parties in writing Waiver by Lessor of any provision 
hereof in one instance shall not constitute a waiver as to any other instance 
This Guaranty was executed in the State of Oregon by Lessor having counters gned it in Washington County Oregon and is to be performed in the State of Oregon by reason of the payments required to be made to Lessor in Oregon 
THIS GUARANTY SHALL IN ALL RESPECTS BE IN i ERPRETED AND ALL TRANSACTIONS THEREUNDER, AND ALL RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES HERETO SHALL BE DETERMINED AND 
GOVERNED AS TO THE VALIDITY, INTERPRETATION ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECT BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
GUARANTOR HEREBY AGREES THAT ALL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS ARISING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM THIS GUARANTY MAY BE LITIGATED, AT THE ELECTION OF LESSOR, ONLY IN 
COUNTIES HAVING SITES WITHIN THE STATE OF OREGON IN WHICH EVENT GUARANTOR HEREBY CONSENTS TO THE JURISDICTION OF ANY STATE OR FEDERAL COURT LOCATED WITHIN THE 
STATE OF OREGON GUARANTOR AGREES THAT IF ANY ACTION IS BROUGHT TO ENFORCE ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS GUARANTY BY EITHER PARTY/N OREGON, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
SHALL BE A PROPER PLACE FOR THE TRIAL OF SUCH ACTION jf 
IMPORTANT THIS AGREEMENT CREATES SPECIFIC LEGAL OBLIGATION DO NOT SIGN IT UNTIL YOU HAVE FULLY READ IT BY9IGNING YOU COMPLETELY AGREE TO ITJ5 TERMS. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Guarantot^ryfe/havejexecuted this Guaranty this «ft ^ ^ V
 d o f mfCfe4>*~^~ 1 9 % | 4 ^ 7 
ytfohn W. CuibtrlidQi, Jr. ^ ^ ^ 2 i L - - - - fc _^Z^ 
GUARANTOR f~S WITNESS 
8. COMMENCEMENT AND EXPIRATION. This Lease shall commence upon Lessor s acceptance of the 
Lease at its pnncipal place of business in Washington County Oregon Lessor shall have no obligation to 
Lessee under this Lease if the Equipment for whatever reason is not delivered to Lessee Lessor shall have 
no obligation to Lessee under this Lease if Lessee fails to execute and deliver to Lessor an Acknowledgement 
and Acceptance of Equipment by Lessee for the Equipment within 30 days after the Equipment is delivered 
to Lessee Unless earlier terminated or canceled by Lessor this Lease shall expire upon the expiration of 
the number of months (following Lessee s acceptance of the Equipment) set forth in "Term of Lease" above 
9. SECURITY DEPOSIT. As secunty for the prompt and full payment of the amounts due under this Lease, 
and Lessee s complete performance of all of its obligations under this Lease and any extension or renewal 
hereof Lessee has deposited with Lessor the security amount set forth in the section shown as "Security 
Deposit" In the event of any default shall be made in the performance of any Lessee s obligations under 
this Lease, Lessor shall have the nght but shall not be obligated to apply the secunty deposit to the curing 
of such default Within 15 days after Lessor mails notice to Lessee that Lessor has applied any portion of 
the secunty deposit to the cunng of any default, Lessee shall restore said secunty deposit to the full amount 
set forth above On the expiration or earlier termination or cancellation of this Lease, or any extension or 
renewal hereof, provided Lessee has paid all of the rent called for and fully performed all other provisions 
of this Lease Lessor will return to the Lessee any then remaining balance of said secunty deposit, without 
interest Said secunty deposit may be commingled with Lessor s other funds 
10. LIMITED PREARRANGED AMENDMENTS; SPECIFIC POWER OF ATTORNEY. In the event it is 
necessary to amend the terms of this Lease to reflect a change in one or more of the following conditions 
(a) Lessor s actual cost of procuring the Equipment or 
(b) Lessor s actual cost of providing the Equipment to Lessee, or 
(c) A change in rental payments as a result of (1) or (2), above or 
(d) Descnption of the Equipment, 
Lessee agrees that any such amendment shall be described in a letter from Lessor to Lessee, and unless 
within 15 days after the date of such letter Lessee objects in writing to Lessor this Lease shall be deemed 
amended and such amendments shall be incorporated in this Lease herein as if originally set forth 
Lessee grants to Lessor a specific power of attorney for Lessor to use as follows (1) Lessor may sign and 
file on Lessee's behalf any document Lessor deems necessary to perfect or protect Lessor's interest in the 
Equipment or pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, and (2) Lessor may make a claim for, receive 
payment of, sign, endorse or negotiate for Lessor's benefit any instrument or document representing 
proceeds from any policy of insurance covenng the Equipment 
11. LESSEE'S REPRESENTATIONS AND WAIVERS. To the extent permitted by applicable law, Lessee 
hereby waives any and all nghts and remedies conferred upon a Lessee by sections 2A-508 through 2A-
522 of the Uniform Commercial Code, including but not limited to Lessee's nght to (i) cancel this Lease, (II) 
repudiate this Lease, (m) reject the Equipment, (iv) revoke acceptance of the Equipment, (v) recover 
damages from Lessor for any breaches of warranty or for any other reason, (vi) a secunty interest in the 
Equipment in Lessee's possession or control for any reason, (VII) deduct all or any part of any claimed 
damages resulting from Lessor's default, if any, under this Lease, (vm) accept partial delivery of the 
Equipment, (ix) "cover* by making any purchase or lease of or contract to purchase or lease Equipment in 
substitution for that due from Lessor, (x) recover any general, special, incidental, or consequential damages, 
for any reason whatsoever, and (xi) specific performance, replevin, detinue, sequestration, claim and 
delivery or the like for any Equipment identified in this Lease To the extent permitted by applicable law, 
Lessee also hereby waives any nghts now or hereafter conferred by or otherwise which may require Lessor 
to sell, lease or otherwise use any Equipment in mitigation of Lessor's damages as set forth in Paragraph 
23 or which may otherwise limit or modify any of Lessor's nghts or remedies under Paragraph 23 
12. LOCATION. The Equipment shall be kept at the location specified above or, if none is specified, at 
Lessee's address as set forth above and shall not be removed without Lessor's pnor written consent Lessor 
shall have the nght to enter upon the premises where the Equipment is located to inspect the Equipment 
dunng normal business hours upon reasonable pnor notice to Lessee 
13. USE. Lessee shall use the Equipment in a careful manner make all necessary repairs at Lessee's 
expense, shall comply with all laws relating to its possession use, or maintenance, and shall not make any 
alterations, additions, or improvements to the Equipment without Lessor's pnor wntten consent All 
additions, repairs or improvements made to the Equipment shall belong to Lessor 
14. OWNERSHIP; PERSONALTY. The Equipment is and shall remain, the property of Lessor, and Lessee 
shall have no nght, title, or interest in the Equipment except as expressly set forth in this Lease The 
Equipment shall remain personal property even though installed in or attached to real property. Lessee shall 
not, without the pnor wntten consent of Lessor, sell, pledge, mortgage, or otherwise encumber Lessee's 
interest in the equipment 
15. SURRENDER. By this Lease, Lessee acquires no ownership nghts in the Equipment, and has no option 
to purchase same Upon the expiration, or earlier termination or cancellation of this Lease, or in the event 
of a default under Paragraph 22 hereof, Lessee, at its expense, shall return the Equipment in good repair, 
ordinary wear and tear resulting from proper use thereof alone excepted, by dehvenng it, packed and ready 
for shipment, to such place or earner as Lessor may specify 
16. RENEWAL At the expiration of the Lease, Lessee shall return the Equipment in accordance with 
Paragraph 15 hereof At Lessor's option, this Lease may be continued on a month-to-month basis until 30 
days after Lessee returns the Equipment to Lessor In the event the Lease is so continued, Lessee shall 
pay to Lessor rentals in the same penodic amounts indicated under "Amount of Each Rental Payment" 
above 
17. LOSS AND DAMAGE. Lessee shall at all times after signing this Lease bear the entire nsk of loss, theft, 
damage or destruction of the Equipment from any cause whatsoever and no loss, theft, damage or 
destruction of the Equipment shall relieve Lessee of the obligation to pay rent or to comply with any other 
obligation under this Lease In the event of damage to any part of the Equipment, Lessee shall immediately 
place the same in good repair at Lessee's expense If Lessor determines that any part of the Equipment 
is lost, stolen destroyed, or damages beyond repair, Lessee shall, at Lessee's option, do one of the 
following 
(a) Replace the same with like equipment in good repair, acceptable to Lessor; or 
(b) Pay Lessor in cash the following (i) all amounts due by Lessee to Lessor under this Lease up to 
the date of loss, (u) the accelerated balance of the total amounts due for the remaining term of this Lease 
attnbutable to said item, discounted to present value at a discount rate of 9% as of the date of loss, and <•••> 
the Lessor's estimate as of the time this Lease was entered into of Lessor's residual interest in the Equipment 
discounted to present value at a discount rate of 9%, as of the date of loss Upon Lessor's receipt of payment 
as set forth above this Lease shall terminate Lessor and Lessee shall be relieved of their respective 
obligations under this Lease, and Lessee shall be entitled to Lessor's interest in such Equipment "as is, 
where is" and without any warranty express or implied from Lessor, other than the absence of any liens by, 
through or under Lessor If insurance proceeds are used to fully comply with this subparagraph, the balance 
of any such proceeds shall go to Lessee to compensate for loss of use of the Equipment for the remaining 
term of the Lease 
18. INSURANCE; LIENS; TAXES. Lessee shall provide and maintain from insurance companies 
satisfactory to Lessor insurance against loss theft, damage, or destruction of the Equipment in an amount 
not less than the full replacement value of the Equipment with loss payable to Lessor Lessee also shall 
provide and maintain comprehensive general all-risk liability insurance including but not limited to product 
liability coverage, insuring Lessor and Lessee, with a severability of interest endorsement, or its equivalent, 
against any and all loss or liability for all damages either to persons or property or otherwise, which might 
result from or happen in connection with the condition use or operation of the Equipment, with such limits 
and with an insurer satisfactory to Lessor Each policy shall expressly provide that said insurance as to 
Lessor and its assigns shall not be invalidated by any act omission or neglect of Lessee and cannot be 
canceled or modified without 30 days prior written noticVto Lessor As to each policy Lessee shall furnish 
to Lessor a certificate of insurance from the insurer which certificate shall evidence the insurance coverage 
required by this paragraph Lessor shall have no obligation to ascertain the existence of or provide any 
insurance coverage of the Equipment or for Lessee s benefit If Lessee fails to provide such insurance Lessor 
will have the right but no obligation to have such insurance protecting Lessor placed at Lessee s expense 
Such placement will result in an increase in Lessee s penodic payments such increase being attnbuted to 
Lessor s costs of obtaining such insurance and any customary charges or fees of Lessor s or its designee 
associated with such insurance Lessor may terminate or allow to lapse any coverage obtained by Lessor 
without having any liability to Lessee Lessee shall keep the Equipment free and clear of all levies liens and 
encumbrances Lessee shall pay all charges, assessments, and taxes (local, state and federal) which may 
now or hereafter be imposed upon the ownership, leasing rental sale, purchase possession or use of the 
Equipment, excluding, however, all taxes on or measured by Lessor's net income If Lessee fails to pay said 
charges, assessments or taxes Lessor shall have the nght, but shall not be obligated to pay such charges, 
assessments or taxes In that event Lessor shall notify Lessee of such payment and Lessee shall repay to 
Lessor the cost thereof within 15 days after such notice is mailed to Lessee 
19. INDEMNITY. Lessee shall hold Lessor harmless and indemnify and defend Lessor against any claims, 
actions damages or liabilities including, without limitation, all attorney s fees ansing out of or connected with 
the Equipment or this Lease Such indemnification shall survive the expiration, cancellation, or termination 
of this Lease Lessee waives any immunity Lessee may have under any mdustnal insurance act with regard 
to indemnification of Lessor 
20. ASSIGNMENT BY LESSOR. Any assignee of Lessor shall have all of the rights but none of the 
obligations of Lessor under this Lease Lessee shall recognize and hereby consents to any assignment of 
this Lease by Lessor, and shall not assert against the assignee any defense, counterclaim, or set-off that 
Lessee may have against Lessor Subject to the foregoing, this Lease inures to the benefit of and is binding 
upon the heirs, devisees personal representatives, survivors, successors in interest and assigns of the 
parties hereto 
21. PAST DUE PAYMENTS; INTEREST. Lessee shall pay to Lessor interest on any delinquent payment 
or amount due under this Lease from the due date thereof until paid at the lesser of the maximum rate of 
interest allowed by law or 18% per annum Lessee shall pay to Lessor any actual additional expenses 
incurred by Lessor in collection efforts including but not limited to long-distance telephone charges and travel 
expenses 
22. DEFAULT. Lessee shall be in default hereunder if 
(a) Lessee fails to make any payment due under the terms of this Lease for a penod of 10 days from 
the due date thereof, or 
(b) Lessee fails to observe, keep, or perform any provision of this Lease, or Lessee breaches any 
representation or provision contained herein, and such failure or breach continues for a penod of 10 days, 
or 
(c) Lessee makes any misleading or false statement in connection with application for or performance 
of this Lease, or 
(d) The Equipment or any part thereof is subject to any lien, levy, seizure, assignment, transfer, bulk 
transfer, encumbrance, application, attachment, execution, sublease, or sale without pnor wntten consent 
of Lessor, or if Lessee abandons the Equipment or permits any other entity or person to use the Equipment 
without the pnor wntten consent of Lessor, or 
(e) Lessee or any guarantor of this Lease dies or ceases to exist, or 
(f) Lessee defaults on any other agreement it has with Lesson or 
(g) A petition in bankruptcy is filed by or against Lessee, or if Lessee sells all or a substantial part of 
Lessee's assets, or if Lessee is a corporation and a majonty of Lessee's voting stock is transferred, or if 
Lessee makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or 
(h) Any guarantor of this Lease defaults on any obligation to Lessor or any of the above listed events 
of default occur with respect to any guarantor 
23. REMEDIES. If Lessee is in default, to the extent permitted by applicable law, Lessor with or without notice 
to Lessee of any kind including, without limitation, notice of intent to accelerate and notice of acceleration, 
shall have the nght to exercise any one or more of the following remedies, concurrently or separately, and 
without any election of remedies being deemed to have been made 
(a) Lessor may enter upon Lessee's premises and without any court order or any other process of law, 
may repossess and remove the Equipment, or render the Equipment unusable without removal either with 
or without notice to Lessee Lessee hereby waives any trespass or nght of action for damages by reason 
of such entry, removal, or disabling Any such repossession shall not constitute a termination of this Lease 
unless Lessor so notifies Lessee in wntmg 
(b) Lessor may require Lessee, at its expense, to return the Equipment in good repair, ordinary wear 
and tear resulting from proper use thereof alone excepted, by delivenng it, packed and ready for shipment, 
to such place or earner as Lessor may specify; 
(c) Lessor may cancel or terminate this Lease and may retain any and all pnor payments paid by Lessee, 
(d) Lessor may declare all sums due and to become due under this Lease immediately due and payable, 
including as to any or all items of Equipment, without notice or demand to Lessee, 
(e) Lessor, in its sole discretion, may re-lease the Equipment, without notice to Lessee, to any third party, 
upon such terms and conditions as Lessor alone shall determine, or may sell the Equipment, without notice 
to Lessee, at pnvate or public sale at which sale Lessor may be the purchaser 
(f) Lessor may sue for and recover from Lessee the sum of all accrued and unpaid rents and bother 
payments due under this Lease, all accelerated future payments due under this Lease, discounted h their 
present value at a discount rate of 9% as of the date of default, plus Lessor's estimate at the time this Lease 
was entered into of Lessor's residual interest in the Equipment, reduced to present value at a discount rate 
of 9% as of the date of default, less the net proceeds of disposition, if any, of the Equipment, 
(g) To pursue any other remedy available at law, by statute or in equity 
No nght or remedy herein conferred upon or reserved to Lessor is exclusive of any other nght or remedy 
herein, or by law or by equity provided or permitted, but each shall be cumulative of every other nght or remedy 
given herein or now or hereafter existing by law or equity or by statute or otherwise, and may be enforced 
concurrently therewith or from time to time No single or partial exercise by Lessor of any nght or remedy 
hereunder shall preclude any other or further exercise of any other nght or remedy 
24. MULTIPLE LESSEES. Lessor may, with the consent of any Lessee hereunder modify extend, or 
change any of the terms hereof without consent or knowledge of any other Lessee, without in any way 
releasing, waiving, or impainng any nght granted to Lessor against any other Lessee Each Lessee is jointly 
and severally responsible and liable to Lessor under this Lease. 
25. EXPENSE OF ENFORCEMENT. In the event of any legal action with respect to this Lease, the prevailing 
party in any such action shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, including attorney s fees incurred at 
the tnal level, including action in bankruptcy court, on appeal or review or incurred without action, suits, or 
proceedings, together with all costs and expenses incurred in pursuit thereof 
26. ENTIRE AGREEMENT; NO ORAL MODIFICATION; NO WAIVER. This instrument constitutes the 
entire agreement between Lessor and Lessee No provision of this Lease shall be modified or rescinded 
unless in writing signed by a representative of Lessor Waiver by Lessor of any provision hereof in one 
instance shall not constitute a waiver as to any other instance 
27. SEVERABILITY. This Lease is intended to constitute a valid and enforceable legal instalment and no 
provision of this Lease that may be deemed unenforceable shall in any way invalidate any other provision 
or provisions hereof all of which shall remain in full forceand effect 
28. NOTICES. Service of all notices under this Lease shall be sufficient if given personally or mailed to the 
party involved at the respective address set forth above or at such other address as such a party may provide 
in writing from time to time Any such notice mailed to such address shall be effective when deposited in the 
United States Mail duly addressed and with postage prepaid 
FORM 114(11/92) 
0<PL\&\^°° 
EXHIBIT 
Bottomline Shop Management System: 
386DX/40Mhz CPU S/N: 
SVGA Color Monitor .28 S/N: 
300CPS HS Printer S/N: S/N: 
101 Enhanced Keyboard 
120MB Hard Drive 
2400 Baud Modem 
4MB RAM 
Bottomline Service Link 
This Exhibit "A" is attached to and a part of Colonial Pacific Leasing 
Lease No. A169552 and constitutes a true and 
accurate description of the equipment. 
M^ STE: £-*- ft 
J.W.C.J.R. Corporat ion 
dba Jac^5 Southwest Collison Repair 
"BY: &tsf* 0'sU4*£***+~-'— 
Fohn W. Cumberledge, Jr. 
TITLE: President 
PLAINTIFF5E5(HIBI^ 
EXHIBIT NO I 
CASE NO xXQDi i i £L | 
DATEREC'D Q - ^ Q ^ f V 
IN EVIDENCE H, O ^ \ 
CLERK i)^S 
Tab 2 
# Colonial Pacific Leai .g 
A Pitney Bowes Company 
LESSEE "PAYMENT 
DISTRIBUTION REQUEST 
DATE 
SUBMITTED TO DP 
INITIATED BY 
' AUTHORI ZEDjlB Y :?•'.; 
6, ! 1 
LESSEE NAME LEASE-^ri^ffiER^r^S*" 
CHECK; SjOJURjCE^UNIT' #_ " . y ^ ^ J s ^ ^ r c ••• 'CHEC^AMOUNT^^' "T: 
(j__) } BLOCKED .. -
( ) NEED LEASE NUMBER-*; 
'(__) DISTRIBUTE , - ' 
••tp*"^.:*-" 
( ) PAYOFF3'^^: ;^;^; : ; ; 
; ( ) POST DATED CHECK "-'• 
:( ) O T H E R ';-•••-•"• -v- ••-'---:---
8? Colonial Pacific Leasing 
A Pitney Bowes Company 
7659 MOHAWK STREET, P.O. BOX 1100 
TUALATIN, OREGON 97062-1100 
TELEPHONE (503) 692-9744 WATS (800)444-1738 LEASE NUMBER 
DATE OF LEASE 
A169S52 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT A N D ACCEPTANCE OF EQUIPMENT BY LESSEE 
SftSHSo^pte^ntSialK68 " * """* ^ ^ Padf iC LeaSin* C o , P « * n t0 m a k° ^ ^ <o * • supplier of the Equipment. Lessee agrees t h ^ E ^ e n t has been 
A ^ S ^ ^ ^ 
DATE OF ACCEPTANCE LESSEE J.W.C.J.R. Corporation dDt J # * > boutmiest uoilison Repair 
IMPORTANT: THIS DOCUMENT HAS LEGAL AND FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES TO YOU 
S I G N 0 N L Y , F Y 0 U H A V E
 ACTUALLY RECEIVED ALLOF THE EQUIPMENT ANDARE COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH IT. 
U. Cmbtrltdgt, Jr.,President * • 
l${$;ACCOUNT NUMBER. 
| | VwV.-. Pi. • • - ' •* •-
II yl^v&fr.r--''.-• • •'• 
II-^-?VP ••'• / ' A^) 
• W / ) v U l ^ G 
.•V:,4»,*,-A..->-, ; U ^ 
| | .^'ftJ;»H£U«ir*2Yr •'*. 
II •- frbftsS!**.^' \ •• - • 
II z^-±.y^-i**Lf v . 
II • :,.-~7./:V--
DESCRIPTION 
' « , ; . , r v . - t - ^ . . % , - v . ' , • , - - . - - • • • - . , . . 
• ' . ' • • • - • • • • * • • - • • , • • " ; • . » . . - r - r " - : ? » - - • • • • : ' - - - : 
• • • . : • • ' • ' " • 
A M O U N T
 : . | | 
. v. ,• r:- II 
— - - • | | 
- *
:v
"ll 
CPLC 2001 
Tab 3 
LEASE NUMBER 084612001 
CODE DATE DESCRIPTION TICKLE 
COMM 07/12/93 MAIL COPY OF LEASE TO LESSEE PER BROKER/KEY CREDIT 
HW 
COMM 07/13/93 MAILED COPY OF LEASE TO LESSEE HW 
120CD 10/27/95 * CONCLUDE LAR AND SUBMIT TO APPROVING AUTHORITY * 
LM 10/27/95 LEFT MESSAGE TO CALL OFFICE 
JOHN SR PG fc JOHN JR/TH 
10/27/55 
COMM 
COMM 
COMM 
IR 
IR 
10/30/95 
10/30/95 
10/30/95 
10/31/95 
10/31/95 
TT JOHN SR SD EQUIP WAS JUNK RETURNEED TO VENDOR 
JUNE 1993 SD STILL RESPONSIBLE FOR LSE SD ATTY SD 
NOT ASKED FOR NAME ft OF ATTY SD HAD 4 ON STAFF DID 
NOT KNOW WHICH ONE WAS HANDLING, RIGHT, ORDRD FILE/T 
WROTE VEN ALERT FWRD TO TE/TH 
INFORMATION REQUESTED EXTERNAL 10/31/95 
WAITING FOR FILE/TH 
INFORMATION REQUESTED EXTERNAL 
ORDRD BUREAU & FMV/TH 
11/01/95 
CLIO 10/31/95 PG DEMAND SENT 
CL16 10/31/95 FINAL DEMAND 11/10/95 
11/01/95 FAIR MARKET EVALUATION 
$1000.00 PER REMKTNG/TH 
11/01/95 ACCOUNT REFERRED TO SUPERVISOR 
LAR TO RB/TH 
11/03/95 
11/01/95 ACCOUNT ASSIGNED TO 90 DAY A/REP 
11/02/95 CASH ENTRY IS BLOCKED 
11/02/95 ACCELERATION LETTER SENT TO ALL PARTIES 11/02/95 
COMM 
COMM 
WCB 
WCB 
LM 
COMM 
11/03/95 
11/06/95 
11/06/95 
11/10/95 
11/14/95 
11/15/95 
CHKG ON VENDOR 
TT HEIDI AT VENDORS- SHE PULLED FILE- NO SIGN 
OF RETURN OF EQPT- SHE WL TT VP & CB TDA...RB 
CUSTOMER WILL CHECK AND CALL BACK - 11/09/95 
NOLL- VP AT VENDORS WL MAKE F/C 2 CHK IF EQPT THER 
CUSTOMER WILL CHECK AND CALL BACK 
NOLL WL GO BY ON 11/13 & ADVISE...RB 
LEFT MESSAGE TO CALL OFFICE 
4 NOLL AT VENDORS...RB 
NOLL CLD- WENT TO BIZ SITE- SD COULDNT VERIFY 
11/13/95 
11/14/95 
ft 
1 
1 0 
13 
16 
17 
18 
19 
•K 
PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 
I EXHIBIT NO. 
CASE NO. 
DATEREC'O 
w EVIDENCE 
[CLERK SJ^R 
LGDL 
11/15/95 
11/15/95 
11/16/95 
SERIAL #S, BUT SD WAS HIS COMUTBR IN BACK ROOM...R 
ACCOUNT REFERRED TO SUPERVISOR 11/15/95 
RFR 2 JN...RB 
MOVED TO LEGAL DEPARTMENT 
PG REFUSES TO PAY...JN 
LEGAL - DEMAND LETTER SENT 
11/16/95 
12/18/95 
23 
25 
LGLT 
CIF 
LGLT 
LGCM 
LGLT 
LGLM 
11/21/95 
11/21/95 
11/21/95 
01/10/96 
01/12/96 
07/29/96 
08/23/96 
08/23/96 
10/07/96 
10/07/96 
10/07/96 
12/23/96 
12/23/96 
02/28/97 
02/28/97 
04/28/97 
04/28/97 
CUSTOMER CALLED OFFICE 26 
J'**:K T.O. SEZ VENDOR PROMISED HIM 30 DAY 
ADDITIONAL LEGAL COMMENTS TO FILE 27 
TRIAL AND EQUIP NEVER WORKED COST WAS SUPPOSE 
2 HAVE BEEN $3800. SEZ HE CLD CPLC AND VENDOR 
ADDITIONAL LEGAL COMMENTS TO FILE 28 
AND TOLD EACH TO PU EQUIP. THIS WAS OVER 2 YRS AGO 
STILL HAS EQUIP IN BOXES 
LEGAL - LITIGATION COMMENTS 01/11/96 29 
FILE 4 W/O 
LEGAL - LITIGATION COMMENTS 
FILE 2 W/O THEN LIT 
LEGAL - LITIGATION COMMENTS 
TO KEN GREENE E LIT HOURLY 
CORRESPONDENCE IN LEASE FOLDER 
COPY OF ATTY DM LTR 2 LESSEB/PQ DATED 7/31 
LEGAL - LITIGATION COMMENTS 
LEGAL - LEFT MESSAGE 
4 ATTY GREENE 415-925-0700 
01/16/96 30 
08/30/96 31 
32 
08/31/96 33 
10/10/96 34 
ADDITIONAL LEGAL COMMENTS TO FILE 35 
PER ATTY. S&C BEING PREPARED. HE HAD 2 GET READMIT 
TED IN UTAH 
LEGAL - LITIGATION COMMENTS 10/31/96 36 
ADDITIONAL LEGAL COMMENTS TO FILE 37 
STILL HASN'T FILED COMPLAINT IN DISTRICT CT. WILL 
HAVE SUIT FILED IN STATE COURT BY BRUCE READING. 
LEGAL - LITIGATION COMMENTS 01/05/97 38 
CORRESPONDENCE IN LEASE FOLDER 39 
FROM ATTY READING 801-531-7870 REQ 4 TRIAL SETTING 
LEGAL - LEFT MESSAGE 03/03/97 40 
ADDITIONAL LEGAL COMMENTS TO FILE 
MARSHA FROM BRUCE READING'S OFFICE 801-531-7870 LM 
ON VM. 
LEGAL - LEFT MESSAGE 05/01/97 
LEASE PROCESSING SHEET 
DATE 06/10/93 PHONE 801-566-3664 
LESSEE NAME JACKS SOUTHWEST COLLISION REPAIR 
APPLICATION NUMBER A169552 
Person authorized by Lessee to verify 
JOHN CUMBERLEDGE JR TITLE :PRES 
1. Is the equipment delivered Y ,installed Y 
and operating at your business ? Y . 
2. When was the equipment delivered 06/11/93 
3. This is a 36. month non-cancelable lease. 
4. We have received ADVANCE PAYMENT of $ 275,88 and a SECURITY DEPOSIT 
of $275.88 . 
5. Name of accounts future checks may be drawn on: 
JACKS SOUTHWEST COLLISION 
6. You will be invoiced monthly for $ 275.88 . 
7. Your next due date will be 07/15/93. 
8. To who's attention ? JACK CUMBERLEDGE JR 
9. What is your mailing address ? 103 E CENTER ST 
City MIDVALE State UT Zip 84047 
10. What is the equipment location ?103 E CENTER STREET 
Eqpt city MIDVALE State UT Zip 84047 
County: SALT LAKE City limits Y 
11. Is the equipment new or used ? New 
12. Assignment: No 
From : 
13. Partial funding letter ? No 
Is this the only equipment you have acquired in the last 3 0 days ?Y 
*************************************************************** 
The person contacted agreed to these terms and approves of disbursment 
of funds to the vendor. 
TIME / DATE 09:46am 06/14/93 BY: *rff/?j# A// / ^ % / ^ 
Page 1 of 2 ' 
Comments: 
06/10/93 6/10/93 8:51 SPOKE TO JOHN.HE SAYS THAT THE 
EQUIPMENT IS DELIVERED, BUT IT IS NOT ALL 
06/10/93 WORKING YET.THE VENDOR IS COMMING OUT 
TODAY TO WORK ON IT.I TOLD HIM WE WOULD CALL 
06/10/93 HIM BACK TOMORROW MORNING.-DEANNA 
06/11/93 LMTCB-MANNY 
06/11/93 SPK/W JOHN (JACK) SD EQUIPMENT IS NOW 
INSTALLED & IN OPERATION. HE SD HE UNDER 
06/11/93 STOOD TERMS & COND OF LEASE. LIAS LTR 
DISCUSSED. OK TO START LEASE. MH 
Page 2 of 2 
Tab 4 
LEGAL DAMAGES REPORT 
JACKS SOUTHWEST COLLISION REPAIR 
Colonial Pacific Lease No. 084612001 
n<U*U.7S V N ° 1 35 Unpaid rental payments of $259.65 
Unpaid sales tax payments of 
Unpaid late charges of ( 2 9 18.18) 
Unpaid personal property taxes 
Residual value of equipment 73**»»Np%0 ^^^ / * C*V I \r 
Costs and expenses 0.00 
Security deposits <275.88> 
Sales proceeds 0.00 
TOTAL DAMAGES: 
^ ^q^c3 . S3 
The above is the total amount of damages due as of JULY 15, 
1993, the date of acceleration. Prejudgment interest should be 
accrued from this date. 
07/15/93 
PAYMENT HISTORY 
JACKS SOUTHWEST COLLISION REPAIR 
Colonial Pacific Lease No. 084612001 
Date Due Date Received Amount Received 
06/15/93 06/15/93 259.65 
Total: 259.65 
Original lease receivable (36 ® 259.65) 9,347.40 
Accrued sale tax 560.46 
Accrued late charges ( 2 ® 18.18) 545.27 
Personal property tax 283.45 
Residual value of equipment 731.00 
Costs and expenses 0.00 
Security deposit <275.88> 
Sale proceeds 0.00 
Total payments received <259.65> 
TOTAL DAMAGES: 10,932.05 
Date Prepared: 09/26/97 
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Tab 5 
Colonial Pacific Leasing Company v. J.W.C.J.R. Corp. 
Computation Of Interest 
(.18/12) x (50) (9,642.83) = $ 7,232.12 
(18% interest 
as stated 
under lease) 
(# of months 
7/15/93 to 
9/15/97) 
(total due 
before 
interest) 
(total 
interest 
accrued) 
+ $ 9,642.83 
Total due with interest $16,874.30 
